AN INTRODUCTION TO MADHVA ONTOLOGY

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TATTVA VIVEKA PUBLICATIONS
Kurubara Sangha Building
Gandhinagar, Bangalore-560009

First Published 1973

Price: Rs. 5-00 (Ordinary)
Rs. 9-00 (Hard bound)

Printed in India by A. K. Murthy at Murthy & Sons
Printers, Bangalore-560003.

To The Sacred Memory of
Mrs. MALATHI BAI PURNAIYA
(1917 - 73)

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PREFACE

In the introduction to this work which follows this preface we have indicated why the book has been written. But that is just one part only of the story of this little work. There is yet another part which needs must be said : how the book came to be written. This part by the very nature of the circumstances has to be narrated by one of the authors only and hence it is written so.

There is yet another purpose also in narrating the story of the genesis of this work. It serves the other purpose of placing on record the indebtedness of the writers to various persons. Another secondary outcome of this record will be the significant light that some of these situations and circumstances throw on the educational ,process itself. Hence this preface, a rather unusual one in its content. The reader may forget the purely biographical and personal elements ; if the aim of such inclusion is recognised the writer feels more than rewarded for the task.

It was sometime in the year 1927 when the writer was just a little kid of four years that he was first sent to a Sanskrit Pathashala by his maternal grandfather even before he was admitted to a regular school for the usual studies in the regional language namely Kannada. Here in the company of many another child of his age he first had an introduction to the time honoured mode of learning Sanskrit : getting the *śabda* and *dhāturūpas* by heart, the *Amara* and many another

stotras. The chanting of the vedas being out of bounds as he had not yet been old enough for the Upanayana. The Acharya who taught was himself a bold and enterprising master who had been inspired by Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. He had established a Rama Mandira with local aid and had vowed to see every child in the small township introduced to Sanskrit. His dynamism and his influence was such that every family feared and respected him and sent without fail the children in the morning for study and in the evening for some pleasant gardening and other work in the backyard of the Pathashala. I have pleasant memories of these days and the learning that came to me did come in the context of joy.

This was not to be for long for me at least. My father who had left me in the care of my maternal grandfather when he was at Bombay resigned his job and came down to Mysore first and then to Bangalore. I was for a while in Mysore in the year 1930 and then came to Bangalore where again the severed thread of Sanskrit studies was resumed. In the middle school I chose Sanskrit as an optional instead of Hygiene and had an advantage over other students because I had learnt a good bit of it earlier. This parallel education, one at the Pathashala in the morning and another at the regular schools which began early was also luckily continued. In Bangalore I became a student of the Sri Veda Vedanta Mandiram Pathasala and under the care of masters, one Sri M. C. Krishna Swamiengar and another older one, Sri Bhasyachar I studied and took some of the Sanskrit examinations. In particular I must mention the thoroughness with which our Bhashyachar dealt with Paninian grammar and his

desire to see that we became as through as he was. Even now his constant words : " Open at page such and such " whenever we went wrong reverberated in my mind. The English translation cannot bring out the full impact of the familiar Kannada expression which used to be charged with that anxiety to rid us of mistakes, that genuine desire to implant in us the habits of correct acquisition. I have not very often recognised in later life the same devotion to the profession of imparting knowledge in the voices of many a person that was brought into the profession by life's bewildering circumstances.

The pathashala gave me good training in the fundamentals of Sahitya and Grammar but my mind was thirsting for the detailed knowledge of Nyaya Vaisesika logic. Its avaccheda and avachinna ridden miltonic sentences exercised an inexpressible fascination for me and I wished to master it. But it was not easy to get one who could help me and give me an insight into this, I tried many a pundit in vain and since this parallel type of education had ingrained in me two attitudes : one of success at an examination and another of learning it, for its own sake I could not be satisfied with partial answers by less informed pundits. It was not until the year 1945 that I could have this desire fulfilled.

In the Central College where I was studying for my degree I was greatly attached to Prof. V. T. Tirunarayaniengar who was the Sanskrit professor at the time. I might in passing tell the reader here that throughout my career the Sanskrit teacher always had a soft corner for me and though I did deserve the high percentage I always obtained in Sanskrit I must perhaps

own that a few percent should be set apart for this. I need not detail why this was so.

One other thing I have felt also. Most of these teachers were free from that "scholastic distance" that often characterises the present day teacher-student relationship. I don't know how far this scholastic distance is due to deficiencies in scholarship! It was Prof. V. T. Tirunarayaniengar who put me in touch with two eminent pundits in Bangalore; the first, only in chronological order of happenings of events connected with my life, Sri Agnihotri Yajna Vittalacharya and the second Sri Hemmige Srinivasa Iyengar. The first was a reputed Madhva scholar well versed in Nyaya also. He was one of the disciples of Sri Satyadhyana Tirtha of the Uttaradi Mutt, probably one of the greatest of modern scholars of the ancient mode of learning. A great disputant and dialectician who taught the intricacies of debate as a seasoned lawyer puts his junior into the possession of the tricks of his profession or as a senior surgeon instructs his novitiates into the art of dissecting the human body for alleviating its pain, Sri Satyadhyana Tirtha had taught my master the great lore of Madhva philosophy. My memories of this great savant and pontif is of the Mudradharana, which I was blessed to have in my grand-uncle's place at Nanjangud when I was just a little child.

Sri Hemmige Srinivasa Iyengar was himself a student of the late Lakshmipuram Srinivasachar a great scholar who has to his credit the *Darsanodaya*, an original work on Indian Philosophy in Sanskrit. Both masters were great disciples of the greater gurus they were blessed witn and I could catch at their feet

something of that dedication to knowledge, that erudition, that thoroughness and the insight which they themselves had got earlier. I could sense whenever I was in their presence the impact of all these qualities and also that "eager looking-forward-to for the right learner" that filled their minds. I cannot say how far they were reciprocated by me in this regard but one or two circumstances could be cited to show they might not have been fully satisfied. Sri Yajnavittalachar would admonish me if I even out of curiosity turned over the leaf of the book when he was teaching me at some point in an earlier page. Hemmige Srinivasa Iyengar would not be content if I just quoted the Panini sutra in support of one of the steps taken in the derivation of any grammatical form unless I also repeated the *vritti* or the exposition of the Sutra.

But I have no memories of days when I had to wait for my master. Early in the morning at four Sri Hemmige Srinivasa Iyengar was up and ready with his book waiting for my arrival. If I was late he would be engaged in practising some music which he said he did not learn when he was younger. He was about sixty at the time. So it was with Sri Yajnavittalachar also. He would be waiting for me and an hour with him had all that careful planning in so far as the material he wished to impart for the day was concerned and the material he wished to test me with to find out how much had sunk into this mind.

Sri Yajnavittalachar had an unusually keen imagination. To him the dull dry concepts of logic and philosophy appeared as if they were in flesh and blood and this ability to concretise the abstract he

could convey to the student. Particularly while dealing with difficult syllogisms of position of philosophy which in the course of argument lent themselves to innumerable remifications and to subordinate divisions and positions. I could easily see that he saw these as though they were before him living and visible things with all their import and significance. Seven years of dull and dry logic and philosophical studies never left the impression of boredom at all. One thing I missed from him was a final sum-up of the Madhva system. This could have been after I had completed the course of studies as detailed by him beginning with Pramanachandrika after a study of the Tarka Sangraha, Deepika and other Nyaya texts, Pramanapaddhati, Tattvasamknyana, Tattva Viveka, Tattvodyota, Mayavada Khandana, Mithyatvanumanakhandana, Upadhikhandana, Vadavali, Bhedojjivana, Vishnutattvavinirnaya, Sudha and Tattvaprakasika. This was the course of studies I had to undergo. I came upto the Vishnutattva vinirnaya and before it could be completed, God had willed otherwise and my Guru was snatched away from me.

Sri Hemmige Srinivasa Iyengar taught me the Paninian system and some Sahitya and Logic also. He knew that the literary sensibilities and potentialities in me had been undeveloped and helped to draw them out. What with my pre-occupation with Mathematics and philosophy I would have turned out to be one drawn out too much on the bed of an intellectua Procrustes. But luckily for me this was set right by this master, to listen to whose expositions of literature was a treat par excellance. He knew the potentialities of the disciple's mind, it's true bent, it's limits and his teaching was directed accordingly. Like the other

master he was a lover of life, he relished a life of material happiness as much as he did the intellectual and the religious. Robust in health and with that unperturbed attitude to the facts of life he broke down some of the inhibitions generated for a while in my mind owing to my other attachment during adolescence, a great deal of association with the Swamis particularly of the Sri Ramakrishna Mutt.

One more thing about Sri Hemmige Srinivasa Iyengar I must also mention. In spite of the great distance that separated me from him in point of knowledge and ability, he dealt with me as he would with a friend. He was conscious that God spared man a short span of life and within this expected some useful activity from him. He never entertained the notion that arises out of the foolish addiction to the maxim *moi le deluge* or after me the deluge. He had a share to do and was content if he could do it. Despite his great erudition he was conscious of the vast world of the unknown and perhaps the unknowable and whenever he taught, this hovered over his expressions.

Again and again he would remind me that the ultimate aim of his teaching was to make me a *vyutpanna*, a person possessed of that minimal equipment that would make him take up the challenges thrown by any scholastic composition. He had his own scheme of books that would complete the round of liberal Sanskritic studies. All this study he used to say would lead me unto the path and the path had to be tread by me alone. I remember the profund effect his last lesson had on me. Sometime in the month of October

he just laid aside the lesson I was to learn and began recounting something of his own life. He told me in a moving manner that he had led a good life of a house-holder, brought up a family, cared for their immediate needs and provided against a rainy day too. He had discharged his parental duties and was a *krithartha*, he had no residuum of desires left. He was happy that good students had received knowledge from him.

Then his tone took a deeper and distant quality. I did not understand its significance then. He told me assuringly I was now a *vyutpanna* and I could embark on my own studies fearlessly. How long do you think, I will be here to teach you, he said and it turned out that it was not long. He said he would return after getting the harvest and he got the harvest for his family and had distributed the harvest of his learning to many. But he did not return. When I went back to meet him after the appointed time I learnt he had passed away: his sturdy frame could only succumb to a chance attack of cholera. His assurance has stood me all these days. Whenever I take up a new work his assurance dispels all the initial fears and I proceed with it.

I went through a tussle in my mind for quite some-time till I got married and this tussle was between the claim of the life of an active well-lived house-holder and a sannyasi. But the words of Pundarika in the Kadambari—Past are the days of *dharmopadesa* ulti-mately, triumphed and I chose the former life. Though I studied a great deal of the philosophy of Sankara and was fascnated and continue to be fascinated by Sankara's writings, his clarity, his simplicity and that

euphony that rings through all his writings, putting one in mind of the best of modern English prose, my temparament and training were directed towards the realism of Madhva. However all these influence have made me more philosophical and though to myself the wisdom of Madhva and his teachings are spiritually relevant, I can still take a critical look even at these and assess to the best of my ability the merits of each system. If I have been saved from an attribute of a fanatical nature it is not only due to the other masters that had an influence on me but also because Sri Yajnavittalachar himself never approved of such an attitude. Even when he dealt with diffiult advaitic positions he would acknowledge the great acumen of the opponent and give him the due share of respect.

My parallel studies directed towards a living and vocation brought me though strange circumstances to the position of an English Professor. It has stood by me in my expressions and it was ever been my endeav-our to present in readable English what the Sanskritist has said in his own difficult way. It is for the readers to judge from what I have written.

All this was just the preparation but the work here undertaken would not bave perhaps seen the light of day had I not had another good fortune. Without this part of the study there can be no completion.

The course of events in my life have left on me the impression that there is some higher will than ours that determines it. It is not some text book maxim that I am quoting here but one that the strange set of circumstances have made me accept. In this scheme

of higher willing I came fortunately in contact with the co-author Sri Raghavendra Rao Puranaiya, hailing from the illustrious family of the Purnaiyas who had lots to do with the destinies of the princely state of Mysore. Dedicated to Madhva's system they have been in their own unpublished manner helped the case. Sri Raghavendra Rao has a good library of Madhva books. He put me in possession of it and did much to put me at ease in the use of this material. Not merely that, he evinced keen interest in the studies and suggested that we should jointly do something for the propagation of a view of life that was the crying need of the hour in India. A view of life and a way that without mincing matters told people that there was a higher power that directed our destiny; that told man to look straight in the face of reality and not to delude oneself into thinking that the wall against which one dashed his head experienced and a living pain was not itself an illusory thing: a view which emphasised the need for virtuous actions: a view that asked man to eat well, to live well and thus to make life a round one of perpetual sunshine; that also corrected the possible by products of some of these attitudes which might make man think that he is the master of his destinies and thus arrogant by telling him that even after he had done everything to merit the summum bonum of life he stood desperately in need of the Grace of the Lord.

So this led to the joint endeavour and here is its first result. If the style betrays to the more observant the impress of a single writer it is because the final finish has been so done. But the work emanated from two minds, each with its own assets and liabilities

and directed so to rid the final product of the effects of the liabilities.

The surroundings has been done. The debt of gratitude has been expressed and it is for those to accept it. Yet I owe another equally great debt to a childhood mate of mine. It is too difficult to express this in words and too tedious to detail circumstances for the reader. Since I know he prefers to remain incognito, I shall, in spite of all the temptation, refrain from mentioning it. He is the embodiment of that nameless tradition of sacred learning that since the Vedas has held the spiritual life of this country together.

Then one thinks of the debt that one owes to the innumerable sages who have cleared the path—the *pathikrits* as the Sanskrit term has it one drops down under its load. There is no way of discharging this: many are out of our reach. The only other mode of repayment is to transmit what we have learnt to others.

21st May 1973 R. A. KASHYAP.

ERRATA

P. xviii	Line 18	read :	against which one dashed his head and experienced a
P. xix	Line 3	read :	The unburdening has been done. The debt of

INTRODUCTION

One of man's gifts is his inborn sense of wonder. A child which has learned the rudiments of language persistently asks why is such and such a thing so. Its senses continually record impressions from the external world. Its mind sorts out these impressions and tries to arrive at some sense or meaning or significance out of a mass of impressions. This ability to analyse and regroup knowledge acquired is common to everyone. But as the mind of man develops and reaches a state of maturity it becomes capable of analysing, sorting out and rearranging whatever happens to be an object of knowledge. This analysis, sorting out and rearrangement of objects of knowledge is the task of one of the branches of philosophy. The items into which we rearrange objects of knowledge are the categories of human knowledge. The rearrangement of human knowledge into categories has been attempted from the earliest of times and is a preoccupation of the philosopher. We find such attempts in the *upanišads* and in the later systems of Indian philosophy. Such categorisation generally is based upon certain principles and postulates which underlie the philosophy that is attempting the task. Hence classification varies from philosophy to philosophy. It also depends upon the nature of the insight the philosopher has into reality. A look at the history of philosophy clearly shows to us that philosophers have proceeded from less satisfactory classifications to more and more satisfactory ones. Not only does such classification acquire a more logically definable status

it also leads to better principles and postulates that can form the basis of a satisfying and acceptable philosophy.

The *Nyāya* school of philosophy enumerated sixteen categories. The *ṣoḍaṣa padārthas* of the *Nyāya* philosopher are well known. Gautama, the famous propounder of the *Nyāya* system in his *Nyāya Sūtrās* has the following *sūtra* or aphorism enumerating the sixteen *padārthas*: The aphorism reads as follows :

pramāṇa-prameya-saṃṣaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhānta-avayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitanda-hetvābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigrahasthānānām-tatvajñānān-niśreyasādhigamah.

The sixteen categories enumerated here of course do not refer to ontological categories we come across either in the Vaśieṣika or in the Vedānta or Sāṃkhya but they refer more to the categories of knowledge or they may be rightly termed epistemological ones.

Actually Nyāya-Vaśieṣika compendiums of a later date have seven *padārthas* as follows :

Dravya-guṇa-karma-'sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyābhāvāh sapta padārthāh.

But that the universe of thought and discourse and of human experience can be divided into various divisions is clear and it is based on what standpoint we adopt and what our object is in such an attempt at classification.

Again the *Vaiśeṣikas* posited six *padārthas*. These two schools of philosophy defined *padārtha* as a nameable or that which can be denoted by the use of a word. These are also the objects of our knowledge. The *Sāṁkhya* system has its own classification which enumerates two entities the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*. Further it goes on to divide *prakṛti* into various subordinate categories.

It has a theory of evolution to account for the manifoldness of our material universe. In the same fashion the other philosophers also have their own categories and they justify them on the basis of certain principles and postulates.

Therefore when we embark upon the study of philosophy we naturally inquire into the various categories into which any system of philosophy cuts up neatly the universe of experience. A study of philosophy therefore might begin by an acquaintance with the categories of such a system. It is also natural that the given division into categories in a system involves a certain amount of answering of objections to such a division as well as showing the inadequacy of divisions and classifications attempted by other schools of philosophy.

The system of philosophy propounded by Madhvācārya has also attempted with perhaps very great success such a classification. Sriman Madhvācārya has dealt with this subject in two books principally and in others also in scattered contexts. The two books that place before us his mode of classification of knowables are the *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* and *Tattva-Viveka*. These two books give us, as their title themselves, indicate an enumeration and a critique of *tattva* or objects of valid knowledge. Of course there are other treatises of his such as the *Tattvodyota* and *Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya* which are more advanced treatises dealing with the subject. But these two books written as they are in memorisable aphoristic verses or *kārikās* are more useful to a beginner and they give in a conspectus-like manner the various classifications of *tattvās*. In these pages we shall attempt a popular presentation of the enumeration and critique of *tattvās*

as done by Sriman Madhvācārya. To the extent desirable we shall also present at relevant places alternative classifications attempted by the better known philosophies and philosophers of India. However it is to be noted that in a book of an elementary nature as this it would be out of place to enter into elaborate discussions, refutations and justifications. But if one acquires for oneself this totality of one mode of classification it will enable him to appreciate other modes of classification and engage himself in a comparative and critical study of different modes of classifications. However it is desirable that one becomes thoroughly acquainted with one mode of classification first. It is with this intention what follows is written with a view to giving a clear account of the categories of Madhva philosophy with such details as are necessary for a better understanding.

CHAPTER I

HARI THE SUPREME THE INDEPENDENT CATEGORY

In the *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* and *Tattvaviveka* of Sriman Madhvācārya the universe of knowables from the highest God to the lowest is first divided into two categories, termed *svatantra* or independent and *asvatantra* or dependent. The Supreme Lord, Hari or Viṣṇu, the one without a second, is the *svatantra tattva* and everything else is *asvatantra*. The others are dependent on him but he is not dependent on anything else for either his essential nature or knowledge or activity. The division of the *tattvās* into *svatantra* and *asvatantra* avoids the pitfalls of a dualistic philosophy earlier propounded by the *Sāṁkhyas*. According to the *Sāṁkhyas*, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are both independent categories. It was this that led to unbridgeable difficulties in the *Sāṁkhya*. The *Sāṁkhya* philosopher attempted an answer by suggesting that these two independent categories like the blind and the lame person attained the goal by a cooperative endeavour. However *Sāṁkhya* philosophy could not answer satisfactorily how a passive non-participating *puruṣa* could have got into the web of *prakṛti*. Further there was always the question of the clash of two real and independent entitles like *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. This difficulty has been solved in the *Vedānta* philosophy by giving to *prakṛti* a secondary and dependent role. In the system of Madhvācārya although other things are also real and they do exist,

only one *tattva* is elevated to the status of an independent entity. All others are dependent on this one independent *tattva*.

It might be asked how do we come to know that there is such an independent *tattva* as *Viṣṇu* or *Hari*. In one of his beautiful hymns called the *Dvādaśa stotra*, Madhvācārya himself provides a reason for asserting that there is a Supreme Lord who controls the destinies of the universe. In this hymn he tells us that this world is subservient to *Hari* because there is no evidence of eternal happiness in the world. All men in this world are subject to misery and therefore there must be some Supreme Lord in whose dominion mortals live. The very fact that uninterrupted and eternal happiness is not possible for human beings clearly points out to the existence of a Supreme Being who is the master of this universe. The verse reads as follows:

yadi nāma paro na bhavet sa harih
kathamasya vaśe jagadetadabhut
yadi nāma na tasya vaśe sakalam
kathamevatu nitya sukham na bhavet. —III-5.

It means:

If *Hari* be not regarded as the Supreme then how is it that this world came to be under His control; if it be said that everything is not under His control then why should there not be uninterrupted or eternal happiness.

The independent or the *svatantra tattva* is so called because it is not dependent on any other thing in respect of three kinds of being—*Svarūpa* or essential nature, *pramiti* or knowledge, *pravṛtti* or competence to act. On the contrary *asvatantra* or the dependent category always stands in need of another in respect

of these three things. Take for instance, any biological entity, its nature is conditioned by various genetic and other factors beyond its own control. In the case equally of *pramiti* or knowledge the same holds true, what, for instance, a human being can know is conditioned by a large number of external factors. Even in the modern world when man has penetrated deeply into the secret of nature, there still remain the vast region of the unknown and perhaps the unknowable. Finally the capacity of members of the dependent category to will to act is also subject to external factors. Naturally therefore there is clear evidence for recognising two types of categories, the independent and the dependent.

It is quite possible to cut up the universe of human experience into different sets of categories. But each philosophy and each philosopher prefers one mode of breaking up things to another. Such a breaking up of various things is not a matter of mere individual preferences; it is based upon the world view which forms the essential feature of the philosophy. Therefore, there is always a justification for the adoption of one mode of classification than another. In this case also the view of Madhvācārya concerning the universe and its ultimate destiny have determined this classification into the independent and the dependent. For, in the system of Sriman Madhvācārya there is one Supreme Lord, *Hari*, who is a *paratara tattva* or a category beyond all other categories. This Lord is independent. He is the master of this universe and of everything that is in it. It is his will that animates every creature and gives to every object its peculiar nature. Naturally this independent category is given importance and the quality of inde-

pendence and its opposite are taken as the bases for a first broad division of categories.

It is also intended that the ultimate end of human achievement is dependent upon this recognition that *Hari* as the Supreme Lord is the master of the universe and it is necessary for others to obey His will, or to alter the well known expression of Tennyson 'To make their wills, His will.' Thus in classifying the categories of human thought in this manner not only does Madhvācārya indicate the divisions into which the universe of ours could be divided, he also, in the true spirit of a *darśanakāra*, points out to us what disciplines in life can conduce to the achievement of the final goal of life. In this sense philosophies of India are not merely speculative enterprises of the human intellect but they are equally ways of life. While it is possible to separate these two and thus approximate our account to the accounts available in Western philosophy, it is desirable to retain the original point of view and treatment. This will provide us with a more accurate and factual account of the system It will also raise another important question: how far are we justified in adopting such a mode of treatment where in the speculative elements exist side by side with the ethical and other elements? This is a matter for controversy. While one can admire the purely intellectual approach, one should also recognise that in India atleast the pragmatic element has got so ingrained in even ordinary mortals that a purely theoretical or intellectual account stands condemned as cold and comfortless. In fact at the beginning of each *śāstra* or subject there is always the discussion relating to the *prayojana* or purpose. The injunction that one should not indulge in an act which is unproductive of something has gone deep into

the Indian mind. This attitude explains why even some of the more speculative minded writers, despite their exclusive interest in intellectual discussion, pay atleast lipservice to the topic of purpose. In fact it is not easy to come across books on Indian philosophy which ignore the question of purpose.

There is another illuminating factor also for this state of affairs, that is many of the disciplines of study proceeded from a desire to interpret and to understand the Vedic texts placing before man the highest truths of existence, his place in the universe and his ultimate destiny. It is natural therefore to expect Indian philosophy taking a course in which speculative concerns are blended with pragmatic considerations.

The two texts of Sriman Madhvācārya on which we have based our exposition here are *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* and *Tatvaviveka*. In the *Tattvasaṅkhyāna* the first aphoristic verse reads as follows.

swatantram asvatantranca dvividham tatvamiṣyate
swatantro bhagavānviṣṇuh bhāvābāvau dvidhetarat

The aphoristic verse means that it is our intention to affirm that *tattva* is two fold: by being divisible into the independent and the dependent. The independent *tattva* or category is the Lord Viṣṇu. The other category viz., the dependent is two fold: the existent and the non-existent.

In the *Tattvaviveka* which is supposed to contain substantiating verses extracted from the writings of *Vedavyāsa* the same subject has been rendered in slightly different words as follows:

svatantram paratantranca prameyam dvividham matam
swatantro bhagavānviṣṇuh nirdoshākhila sadguṇah

The verse means that it is our opinion that knowables are of two kinds: the independent or the other. The independent is the Lord Viṣṇu who is without blemishes of any kind and who is possessed of every-known good quality or virtues.

The two texts more or less repeat the same ideas in slightly different words. As we notice in the latter here there is a slight elaboration of the nature of the independent category. Two qualities are predicated of it: freedom from all blemishes and the possession of every conceivable good quality and virtue. Since the dependent category is subject to control in respect of its nature, its knowledge and its volitional activities it cannot be considered as free from restrictions or the possession of every conceivable good quality. But the independent category possesses all these and therefore stands totally distinct from the rest of the knowables.

It is customary in a philosophical treatise in Sanskrit to adopt a course of treatment of the subject. While commenting on one of the books of Jayatīrtha, the *Pramāṇa Paddhati* or the pathway to valid knowledge Sri Rāghavendraswāmy states in detail this mode of presentation of the subject matter as consisting of the following steps: *Uddeśya* or general enunciation or statement; *sāmānyalakṣana* or a broad general definition *vibhāga* or division into further categories; *viśeṣoddeśya* or special and particular enunciations or statements; *viśeṣalakśana* or special definitions; *parikṣa* or examination. In these two books also we come across these steps of a philosophical treatise. However it must be noted in passing that these two books being very short summaries of the elaborate subject of the ontology of the Madhva system the examination part of it is only hinted at but not fully dealt with. Even in

regard to the definitions either they are contained or suggestively indicated in the names used for stating the divisions and subdivisions of categories. However it would be more appropriate if we looked at these books from a traditional point of view. The aphoristic verses are to be regarded more less as brief notes and statements of the teacher who would have expounded the subject at greater length to his students. These aphoristic verses were recorded for purposes of retention of the subjects dealt with. Therefore it would be appropriate to consider the texts of Madhvācārya along with the commentaries of Jayatīrtha as constituting complete units in themselves. We may consider Jayatīrtha as the best of Madhvācārya's students faithfully and accurately incorporating all that was explained and elaborated by Madhvācārya. This is not to suppose that Jayatīrtha was a direct disciple of Madhvācārya. It has been the practice of all students and teachers of the Madhva's system to regard Madhva's writings along with Jayatīrtha's commentaries as units in themselves, We have also followed the same practice here. Viewed in this light the two books *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* and *Tattva Viveka* possess all the steps enumerated above.

It is customary also to begin a work after offering obeisance to a deity. This is known as a performance of a *maṅgala*. The performance of a *maṅgala* has been in vogue among the elite and cultured people from times immemorial. It is even stated that there was a vedic injunction to the effect that a person desirous of completion of a work should perform a *maṅgala* at the beginning. Such a performance of *maṅgala* in the beginning is supposed to conduce to the successful and unobstructed completion of a contemplated undertaking. In books of *Nyāyavaiśeṣika*

philosophy there is an elaborate discussion of the subject under the title *mangala vāda*. There are two primary schools of thought which consider *mangala* as responsible for successful completion of a work and the warding off of obstacles to completion. The latter school of thought feels that the completion of a work is due to the abilities and genius of the author and the performance of a *mangala* itself cannot produce completion. This seems more reasonable than the first view. The chief defects and the shortcomings of the *mangala vāda* are that we have to explain two sets of awkward facts: one, the existence of books written by non-believers in God where without the performance of a *mangala* we observe a successful completion; two, the existence also of books by believers in God where in no successful completion of a work is seen even though a *mangala* has been performed. Various explanations are given; some of them are ingenious ones but they do not appear to be satisfactory from a rational point of view. In the Madhva system such awkward factors have been explained by having recourse to the view that it is not essential that a certain end must invariably be attained through only one set of actions. That is to say there may be different processes capable of producing the ultimate end.

In both these books we do not find a *mangala* as such separately performed and incorporated. Jayatīrtha explains the fact by suggesting two things. Sriman Madhvācārya being a great believer in God would not have ignored performing a *mangala*. Therefore it is assumed a mental or *mānasika mangala* has been performed. Another explanation is that Madhvācārya has begun the work by taking the name of the Supreme Lord and designating him as the independent or *svatantra*. So what more need be done than taking the name of the Lord.

Tattva or the knowable has been defined as that object of knowledge which is free from the superimposition of an illusory knowledge. Thus an illusion such as the mistaking of a rope for a serpent or conch shell for silver does not come within the perview of *tattva*. The words used here are *prameya, tattva* and *pramiti viṣaya*. In the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* philosophy all categories of thought have been included under the name of *padārtha*. *A padārtha* is understood in its etymological sense as that which is the referent of a word or it is nameable. Whatever man is able to recognise as existing and whatever he can name is a *padārtha*. It is interesting to note that modern philosophies which place a great deal of importance on language and linguistics have also arrived at such a designation for classifying things.

It is possible to undertake a division of all *tattvās* in different ways. It is possible to look at them as sentient and nonsentient, eternal and non-eternal and existent and non-existent. But in adopting this first classification into *svatantra* and *asvatantra* or the independent and the dependent Madhvācārya has specially emphasised the unique character of the Supreme Lord of the universe. There is no denying the fact that *Hari*, the Supreme Lord is sentient, is eternal and is also existent but over and above these characteristics which are shared by either severally or in combination with other things, *Hari* alone is the independent *tattva*. Apart from this metaphysical distinction there is also another consideration that is relevant to the system of Madvācārya as a *darśana*, a system of philosophy and a way of life in one. It is

only by recognising the fact, the Supreme Lord *Hari* is the independent one and everything else is dependent, that man can achieve his ultimate destiny. Thus the classification serves the purpose of indicating the right attitude that an aspirant should take towards the Supreme Lord of the universe. It is not one of rejection of His existence or the repudiation of his independence or even is it the assumption of an attitude of identity with the Lord that is approved of here. Even in a state of liberation the *jīva* or the individual self will still remain dependent on the Supreme Lord.

Elsewhere in the works of Sriman Madhvācārya the categories have been divided slightly differently. For instance there is the division of *padārthās* in the *Madhva bhāṣya* into four categories viz., *Iśvara* or God, *prakṛti*, the *jīva* or the soul and *jaḍa*, the nonsentient matter. There is also the other division on the analogy of the *Nyāyavaiśeṣikas* into ten categories as opposed to the seven of the latter. The ten categories of Madhva philosophy are: *dravya* or substance, *guṇa* or quality, *karma* or action, *sāmānya* or class character, *viśeṣa* or particularity, *viśiṣṭa* or the qualified, *aṁśi* or the whole, *śakti* or power, *Sādṛśya* or similarity and finally *abhāva* or negation. The fact that there are such differences in the categorisation does not imply any inconsistency in the system. On the other hand it only recognises the fact that classification is a matter dependent upon such considerations as emphasis, classifying principles and purpose. This is so because the multiplicity of objects in the universe possess varying characters and as such they lend themselves into differing divisions. If we take a look at the ten categories we will not fail to see how a mind interested in classification came to recognise their existence. In this universe we become aware

of *dravya* or substance. The substances possess certain qualities like hardness, whiteness etc. Therefore quality is a category which we can recognise. In the case of living beings also we find certain qualities such as gentleness, ferocity etc. When we look at a number of things we find that they have certain common features and also certain features which are essentially their own. This leads us into accepting or positing a *sāmānya* or class character, *viśeṣa* or particularity. In the same manner the other categories also can be shown to arise out of some condition which enables man to give them the status of a category. In advanced treatises of philosophy these classifications, the criteria for such classification, the superiority of one mode of classification over another accepted by different schools of philosophy, elaborate discussions on the tenability or untenability of these classifications all find statement. But in introductory books like these two there is very little scope for such elaboration. But that these have been done on the basis of such careful considerations is hinted at in the expressions used. For instance, words like *iṣyate*, *matam* etc., suggest that these divisions have been made after a serious consideration of the various issues involved. Here an attempt has been made to indicate the existence of different ontological systems and to point out why Madhvācārya has adopted a certain system of ontology. We have also indicated where a more elaborate discussion of these may be found for the enlightenment of those who wish to pursue the subject at greater length.

Tattva was earlier defined as the object of valid knowledge which is not superimposed. It is possible to raise an objection here: Why should we not consider silver-in-conchshell as *tattva*? The conchshell is a

knowable, silverness also is a knowable and their relationship also is a knowable. It cannot be objected that silverness is not in the entity called conch shell because by the mere fact that silverness does not reside in the entity, conch shell, it does not cease to be an object of knowledge; just as Devadatta or a person does not cease to be an object of knowledge merely because he is not at home. That is because we posit the existence of Devadatta elsewhere. In reply to this objection the answer given is that such an objection is tenable in the case of those who regard the superimposed entity as existent elsewhere. But in Madhva's view in such cases of illusory knowledge an altogether nonexistent silver by reason of defects in perception is super-imposed upon the conch shell.

It is not reasonable to hold the view that no *tattvās* exist because such a view is opposed to valid means of knowledge like perception etc.; that is to say we can see that there are *tattvās* or we can infer their existence through a process of reasoning. If it is further asserted that what we perceive or infer as a *tattva* is illusory then how do we account for the absence of contradiction. Every case of illusion has a terminus when it is contradicted by valid knowledge. Further it is inconceivable to speak of an illusion that has no substratum. Nor can we say that contradiction is without a terminus. That is to say whenever we experience an illusory piece of knowledge it occurs in a particular substratum. For instance a rope may be the substratum for an illusion of a snake and this illusion comes to an end the moment we obtain the valid knowledge that what we saw was not a snake but a rope. Thus to speak of *tattva* as an illusion is not correct.

Another view-point that of the *advaitin* is that there is only one *tattva*. To this the answer given is such an assertion is contrary to the recognition of difference by us. If this difference again is asserted to be not a real one but an illusory one we reply by saying there is contradiction. This is a subject matter of considerable importance and takes us into the primary dispute between the non-dualistic schools of philosophy and the dualist. It is too elaborate to be entered into here. Therefore a consideration of the question may be pursued in more advanced treatises of Madhva philosophy.

The other variants such as the view that everything is independent or everything is dependent equally suffer from defects and inconsistencies. If everything is independent the idea of dependence would have to be discredited. Further eternal happiness should be possible for everybody. On the other hand if everything is dependent we are led into an infinite regress and no entity will ever have any existence. In addition to this such a view is contrary to the revealed texts.

Finally the purpose of this mode of division is to indicate to the aspirant that a knowledge of the dependent categories as ultimately conditioned and controlled by the independent category alone conduces to the ultimate good which is the summum bonum of life. This is also what Madhvācārya says towards the end of this treatise. Had this been not so this division and subdivision would turn out to be as futile as counting pebbles on the seashore.

In the *Tattva viveka Tika* of *Jayatirtha* we have a few of the different ontological enumerations stated as the view-points of opponents. He points out that

there are schools of philosophy which divide *tattva* into two divisions either as the existent or non-existent, the sentient or the non-sentient or the eternal and the non-eternal or the name and the form. There are some who divide *tattva* into three categories viz., name, form and action. There are yet others who divide *tattva* into the four categories of substance, quality, action and generic quality. Others add inherence to these four to account for five categories.

Jayatīrtha refers to the five *skandhas* enumerated by the Buddhists. According to the Buddhist view point all *Dharmas* can be classified into five *skandhas* or heaps, the twelve sense fields and the eighteen elements. Jayatīrtha refers here only to the *skandhas* or heaps which happen to be the constituents of personality. This classification of personality into five constituent heaps is in keepnig with the Buddhist way of life and its discipline which is directed towards the ultimate annihilation of personality. Personality is shown to consist of these transient heaps or groups so that the aspirant may disassociate himself with them. Madhva's classification runs contrary to this conception as jīvas or the individuals are to be regarded as real and existing. The five *skandhas* are *rūpa* which may be defined as material or physical side of things; *vedanā* or feelings which may be pleasant, unpleasant or neutral; *sañjnā* or perceptions corresponding to the sense organs; *saṁskāra* or impulses which are tendencies, active dispositions, volitions, strivings, emotions etc., whether they are conscious or repressed; and finally *vijñāna* or consciousness. We shall however content ourselves with refering to these in passing and not enter into further elaboration.

CHAPTER II

THE EXISTENT AND THE NON-EXISTENT

The *svatantra* category is one and indivisible. It is also that by virtue of which everything else has its being, the realisation of which can come home to a person who is able to recognise the complete difference between or the total dissimilarity of the independent category from everything else. For this purpose a knowledge of the other categories becomes essential. Therefore Madhvācārya proceeds to analyse the other category of the dependent one into further divisions. The other category may be conveniently divided into the existent and the non-existent.

In this world we are aware of various objects, and a little thought will easily convince us that we are not only aware of the existent things but also of the non-existent ones. However this sense of the non-existent is always dependent on the recognition of the counter-positive or the *pratiyogi* or the object with reference to which we are speaking of the non-existence. We see objects and we find that they are not there; they have moved away or disappeared. A comet appears in the sky suddenly from somewhere and we see it for a couple of days and then it disappears. The moment we see it we become aware of the non-existence of this comet before its appearance. We talk of the comet as having not been there before. We similarly talk of the non-existence of the comet after it has disappeared. We also recognise the

impossibility of the existence of certain things such as the horn of a hare or the son of a barren woman. From these it should be clear that the categorisation of non-existence is rooted in our own experience and in our daily intercourse. Therefore of the two categories, the existent and the non-existent, the primary one is the existent and the secondary one, the non-existent. Therefore in enumerating and classifying the *asvatantra* or the dependent category the existent is named first.

The existent and the non-existent can be put in the form of an assertion and a negation. The existent one is that which is recognised or obtained as the one that is when a first knowledge of something comes to us. The same can be conversely of the form of negation and assertion. When there is a first perception of an object the essential form of it is registered on our minds. Next we become aware of its other qualities etc. Take for instance the knowledge expressed in the following statement—There is a pot here but it is not white. Similarly consider the knowledge expressed by the statement—There is no pot here but there is the absence of a pot. In these two cases we notice that the recognition of existence and non-existence might be either in the form of an assertion or negation or it may be in the form of a negation and an assertion. Hence it is possible for the existent and the non-existent to be stated either in the form of an assertion or in the form of a negation but what is first stated as an assertion is the existent and what is stated next is the non-existent. This so because in language it is possible to express it in these forms.

In the Nyāya system we come across the categorisation of Abhāva and a fairly fuller account of its

divisions and subdivisions. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system the seventh category is the category of non-existence. It is defined as the category which is other than the six earlier mentioned, namely, *dravya guṇa, karma, sāmānya, samavāya* and *viśeṣa*. Ever since the Nyāya school dealt with the subject other philosophies in India have more or less used this and have accepted it with all its attendant classifications.

To understand the subject in the manner in which it has been dealt with by the Nyāya thinkers it is necessary to say a few words about how *abhāva* or non-existence is presented by this school. Take an instance like the non-existence of a pot on a piece of the earth or a part of the earth. It is necessary to note that the idea of non-existence always arises with reference to two things: one, the object of which the non-existence is being predicated; two, the substratum on which such a non-existence is being known. The Nyāya school uses the term *pratiyogi* or counter-positive for the object of which we are asserting non-existence and *anuyogi* or the substratum on which such a non-existence is being recognised.

Further we become aware of non-existence in these ways: A certain object comes into being, having been recently produced. Upto this moment there is a vague and indefinable sense of something non-existent and then the moment the object is produced we become aware of its having not existed before. The production of the object gives an actualising value to this vague feeling of non existence which we may suppose to have been in a potential state. This sort of non-existence is known as antecedent non-existence or *prāgabhāva*. We also become aware of the non-existence of an object after it is destroyed. This is posterior non existence or

pradhvaṁsābhāva. These two non-existences have a terminus as it were, posterior non-existence begins after the destruction of its *pratiyogi*, antecedent non-existence is destroyed the moment the *pratiyogi* comes into being.

We are also aware of the absence of a thing in a particular place when it is removed from the place or brought back to it. This sort of *abhāva* which comes into being and disappears is also something we are able to recognise. A pot which is not yet burnt may be brownish and after it is burnt it turns red. We may speak of the non-existence of the red colour and the non-existence of the brown colour before and after burning.

There are also other kinds of non-existences. There are certain impossible entities like the hare's horn or the flower in the sky or the son of a barren woman. These do not exist now, they have never existed in the past nor will they ever exist in future. This is a non-existence at all times.

We may also speak of the non-existence of one thing in another. We may consider mutually exclusive characteristics and things. We may speak of a pot not being a piece of cloth and so on. Thus we see that it is possible to speak of different kinds of non-existences.

Nyāya school divides the non-existents first into two divisions: the non-existence born of contact and the mutual non-existence. *Samsargābhāva* and *anyonyābhāva*. *Anyonyābhāva* is the excluding variety spoken of above. According to them there is the non-existence of a jar in cloth and non-existence of a cloth in a jar. In Madhva's system this kind of non-existence is not accepted because according to it this is another name merely for difference. We can simply say that a pot is

different from a jar; it is the nature of a pot to be different from a jar

The *saṁsargābhāvas* are accepted without his idea being attached to them, the idea that is based on contact. This is because according to the Madhva school the cause and effect relationship need not be based on the existence of the cause and the effect in the same substratum; while the Nyāya theorists always assert that there is the need for a common substratum. On this theory the Madhva school while accepting the three divisions of the *Saṁsargābhāva* of the Nyāya school dismisses the first category of the *Saṁsargābhāva* but gives to the three divisions the status of a membership of the broader category of non-existence. The three divisions are already alluded to in the examples. The antecedent non-existence or *prāgabhāva*, the posterior non-existence or *pradhvaṁsābhāva* and absolute non-existence or non-existence always. The word *atyantābhāva* is replaced by the word *sadābhāva* in Madhva system.

The divisions, *Pradhvaṁsābhāva* and *sadābhāva* are easily understood. But *prāgabhāva* is liable to be questioned. In the *Dinakarīya*, a commentary on the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* of Viśvanāthapañcānana there is a discussion on the subject. The fact is that this kind of non-existence becomes actualised only on the production of the object. Until then it is to be considered as existing in a state of potentiality. If it is not actualised at sometime it may be due to the operation of counteracting agencies, the removal of which will make the actualisation possible.

The category of the non-existent lends itself to a not very elaborate subdivision, where as the category of the existent being far too numerous will have to be

divided and subdivided to a great extent. Therefore although it is proper that the existents should be first considered, Madhvācārya divides first the non existents. This is purely for reasons of convenience and quick disposal.

It is usual to refer to the object of which non-existence is spoken of as the *pratiyogi* or the counter positive of that non-existence. Since such a non-existence is spoken of with reference to a substratum where it becomes evident, this substratum is spoken of as *anuyogi*. The Nyāya theorists explain this as follows: Let us take an example such as is indicated by the sentence 'There is no jar on this piece of earth.' Such a statement as this means that we become aware of the non-existence of a jar on a piece of earth. Here the jar is the *pratiyogi*; the piece of earth is *anuyogi*. Such techniques of explanation are adopted by the *Nyāya* philosopher to give a more precise meaning to statements. The *Nyāya* philosophers have actually developed a jargon of their own which enables philosophical statements to be expressed in a language which like that of mathematics is precise and accurate. Other schools of philosophy also have taken over this jargon, refining it and altering it in order to make it consistent with their own views and view points. Perhaps of all these schools of philosophy that have so utilised this jargon of the *Nyāyavaiśeṣikas*, Madhva's seems to be the most important. In fact some very original contributions have been made by the Madhva thinkers in this field of study. Even a mention of some of the works of Madhvācārya and his followers will indicate how deeply concerned the Madhva school of philosophy is with the intellectual disciplines evolved and developed by the *Nyāya* thinkers. Madhvācārya is not content

with giving us a traditional *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* in order to establish his title to be called an Ācārya. He has supplemented this one with another exposition of the *Brahma Sūtra* under the title Anuvyākhyāna which concerns itself more with the rationality and logic of his positions than merely with an exposition of the subject matter. Further Madhvācārya constantly refers to a now non-extant work of logic viz. the *Brahma Tarka*. He has also written such treatises as the *Pramāṇalakṣaṇa* discussing valid knowledge and its means, *Kathālakṣaṇa* on the exposition of intellectual discourse. His followers have elaborated these seminal ideas and written extensively. Jayatīrtha has dealt with these in great detail in his commentaries and has also written an independent work on the epistemology of Madhva's system. Perhaps the prince among these all is the great Vyāsatīrtha or Vyāsarāya Swāmi. He seems to have embarked upon a task such as the one attempted by Gangeśa Upādhyāya a few centuries earlier. Just as Gangeśa founded a new system of logic, Vyāsarāya has also expounded a system of logic which is a sequel to Madhva's philosophy. His *Tarka tāndavam* is considered almost the last word in the field of Indian logic. S. N. Dasgupta in his History of Indian philosophy Vol. IV goes on to tell us that the logic of Vyāsarāya in certain aspects remains unsurpassed even in western logic. Other names such as *Nyāyāmṛta*, *Yuktimallika* etc. again emphasise the special leaning of Madhva philosophy to logic. In fact among Madhva philosophers *vāda* or scholastic dispute and discussion even to this day is a living tradition and year after year *Vidvat Sabha's* are held and disputants are suitably honoured and rewarded for their participation in such debates.

Among the *Mīmāṁsakās* the Prābhākara school holds the view that there is no need to accept the category of non-existence. Of course the other school of Kumārila Bhatta does not accept this view; Kumārila agrees with the Nyāya School in accepting negation or non-existence as a category. Prābhākara view is that there is no negation or non-existence and what is actually perceived is the locus itself. Over and above this existence there is no need to posit the non-existent as a separate category. Existence is perceived either in itself or as related to something else. The apprehension of bare existence of the locus itself is wrongly called non-existence. He explains the cases such as there is no jar on this ground and there is the antecendent non-existence of a jar before its production in the following manner. In the first example it is nothing but the apprehension of the mere ground itself. In the second it is nothing but the clay itself. Jayatirtha questions the statement, *bhūtalamātra viṣaya* in his commentary and shows that this is untenable. Negation or non-existence is not mere nothing. When we perceive the mere ground we don't perceive either the jar or its non-existence. Therefore the perception of the mere ground is different from the perception either of the jar or its non existence.

When the *Mīmāṁsakās* assert that the awareness of non existence is *bhūtala mātraviṣaya* or is the mere apprehension of the ground itself, what do they mean. If the ground alone is meant when the term *bhūtala-mātra viṣaya* is used then the cognition of the non-existence of a pot might arise even with reference to the ground on which there is a pot. If this is not so and if the cognition of the non-existence is the object of some other entity then there are two possible questions. Is this thing of which the non-existence is being related the counter positive, namely the pot or is it some other object? In the first case such an awareness must arise even when there is a pot on the ground. In the second case such an awareness must arise in an entity like 'form' or *rūpa* which is different from the substratum of the form of the pot as well as the counter positive of the negation such as '*gandho nāsti*' or there is no smell. In reply to this the *Mīmāṁsakas* urge another difficulty as the criterion for their view. The *Mīmāṁsakas* ask: Is the non-existence of a jar related to the earth that has a jar in it? Or is the relationship to the earth that has no jar in it. In the case of the first there is a contradiction and in the latter case there is self-dependence. It is for this reason we say that it is nothing other than the ground itself. In reply to this Jayatirtha says: let us look at the question itself. Does the question mean: What is the nature of the ground before the contact of the non-existence arises? or what is its nature at the time of such a contact? Or if this ground is going to be discriminated from the non-existence then of what nature will it be? In the first case the reply is that the ground is in contact with the jar. In the second the ground is in contact with the non-existence of the jar. In the third case if this non-existence relates to the object then owing to the disappearance of the non-existence the answer is it is related to the ground with the jar. If the non-existence is with reference to the cognition of it through the intellect itself it is to be spoken of as having the awareness of the jar. Otherwise it is possible to ask the same questions of an existent like the jar. We may ask: Is awareness of the existence of a jar related to the ground that has a jar in it or has not

a jar in it; From this we may also draw the conclusion that it is enough if we have the awareness of the ground and there is no need for the awareness of the jar. Jayatīrtha does not go further into the hair-splitting logic involved in this but has pointed out the need for the positing of the category. Except for the Prābhākara school most others accept the category of non existence and the Nyāya classification and analysis is more or less taken for granted by all Indian thinkers.

The *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* text reads:

Prāk pradhvamsa sadātvena trividho bhāva iṣyate

The verse means: the category of non-existence is three fold; non-existence prior to creation, non-existence after destruction, and non-existence at all times.

The *Tattvaviveka* text reads:

pūrvāpara sadātvēna trividhobhāva iṣyate
bhāvābhāva svarūpatvāt nānyonyābhāvatā pṛthak

Abhāva is three fold: previous non-existence, past non-existence and non-existence at all times. Being of the nature of both existence and non-existence the *anyonyābhāva* is not a separate kind.

CHAPTER III

THE EXISTENT THE SENTIENT AND THE NON-SENTIENT

Having disposed of the subject of non-existence and its further divisions the earlier enunciated category of the existent iṣ taken up for consideration. Everything else is now to be included and given a convenient place in the category of the existent.

The existent category is divided into two further subdivisions as the sentient and the non-sentient. Since everything else which is non-sentient is meant for the sentient, the sentient is enumerated first. The *cetana* category is so termed because it has the ability for right knowledge. It is not to be doubted that there are the two categories of the sentient and the non-sentient. The view that everything is sentient and there is nothing that is non-sentient is unacceptable. Jayatīrtha doesn't in his commentary consider this objection in detail. However he alludes to the Vedic texts which have been pressed into service by others to arrive at such a conclusion. We come across such statements as *mṛdabravit, āpobruvan, tatteja aikṣata, oṣadhayasaṁvadante.* This is discussed at length in the *abhimāni adhikaraṇa* in the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya.* There it is clearly pointed out that these texts donot mean that these non-sentient, entities like the earth, the water; the fire and the plants are capable of performing functions of sentient beings but they have to be understood as standing for the patron deities of these non-sentient things. It should be

noted here that whenever there is a seeming contradiction between two modes of valid knowledge a careful consideration of their respective strengths is made. In this case it is against reason to accept the possibility of non-sentient entities capable of functioning as sentient ones. Therefore the *Vedic* texts are analysed and their import is more suitably brought out in a way that does not conflict with reason.

The *cetana* or the sentient is further divided into *duhkhaspṛṣṭa* and *duhkhāspṛṣṭa* that is to say that which is affected by sorrow and that which is not affected by sorrow. The term 'affected by sorrow' must be understood as that which had at sometime or the other undergone misery. Whereas the other category is that which has at no time undergone misery. According to the system of Madhva, Ramā or the consort of Viṣṇu alone is the entity which is not at any time affected by sorrow.

There are two views concerning this classification, both of which are unacceptable. The first view is that there is nothing in this universe which is tainted with sorrow because sorrow is not real but it is only an imagined thing. Against this proposition the answer given is that such a view is contradicted by the direct perception of misery. The second position is that there is no being other than *Īśwara* who is free from suffering. This view is contrary to the *āgama*. A minor objection concerning the mention of *Duhkhāspṛṣṭa* first as the other is the more important one is easily answered by suggesting that of the latter there becomes the necessity of that object of which it isfree. Here Ramā is free from the taint of suffering, therefore in her we become aware of the absence of suffering or *duhkha*. Hence to speak of Ramā as that category which is free from the taint of misery, it becomes neccessary to refer to the other

category which is tainted with misery. It is for this reason that the order has been changed.

The Rāmānuja school of Vedānta divides the individual selves or *jīvas* into the category of *vyaṣṭi* and *samaṣṭi* or the liberated ones and those who are bound or going through the cycle of births. According to this school even the bound ones such as *garuda ananta, viṣvaksena* are spoken of as free from the taint of misery. In order to controvert this view it is here asserted that *Ramā* or the consort of *Viṣṇu* is the only being that is free from the taint of misery. Therefore the question of dividing the category of the misery untainted any further does not at all arise. This division of the Rāmānuja school is not accepted because according to the Madhva thinkers there is no support for such a division in the āgamas. It is stated that except *Śrī* and *Śrīpati* all other *jīvas* or selves are afflicted with misery.

The category of the *duhkhaspṛṣṭa* is further subdivided into two members viz. the *vimuktās* or the liberated souls and the *duhkhasaṁsthās* are subject to misery which returns to them again and again.

The *duhkhasaṁstha* may further be subdivided into those who are competent for liberation and those who are incompetent for liberation. These are respectively termed *Muktiyogya* and *Muktyayogya*. The *Muktiyogyās* are those who have the competence to become later on liberated souls provided they betake themselves to requisite spiritual discipline. But the other category of the *muktyayogya* comprises of those beings who are rendered incapable of any further progress. They are condemned to suffer and they may go down and down and sink into the irredeemable depths of hell.

This division which is also paralleled in Christian

Theology has been responsible for much discussion and controversy concerning a possible Christian influence. As Dr. Nagaraja Sarma points out in his Reign of Realism, 'Parallel thinking and speculation are perfectly possible by system builders and writers and there is no improbability in the view that Madhva arrived at his own conclusions independently of any influences Christian or Islamic.' It must also be noted that Madhva extensively quotes the earlier works of Śruti and Smṛti and asserts that every one of his views is based upon what the great Vedavyāsa himself said. We might here remind the readers that Madhva composed not only the *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* but also *Tattvavivēka* of which the latter one is stated to be a work in which Madhva has quoted the writings of *Vedavyāsa* himself concerning the subject matter of *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* in order to substantiate his own statements. Therefore it is clear that a tradition of this sort was in existence even from the earliest of times. We might also notice in passing another fact. In spite of all the great progress we have in the modern world in respect of communication still year in year out we come across books, statements etc. made by otherwise knowledgeable persons who seem to be ignorant of the writings of Madhva and his school. If this is the case to day one can easily conjecture what might have been in ancient days. If we remember also the invasions, the destructions and the rampage which India witnessed during foreign invasions one cannot but wonder what has happenned to a large number of manuscripts. Taking these into consideration we might at least adduce a negative reason against such hypothesis as Christian influence. Madhvācārya was only reviving and propagating probably a less known

though a sounder view of life that might have been in existence from very early times of Indian speculation.

One other objection to this classification of souls into the incompetent for liberation and competent for liberation is put in the question: can a merciful God consign some of his own creatures to eternal damnation? This has to be loooked into from a point of view which is free from passion, prejudice and 'subjective sentimentalism.' In this world we have been witnesses to the problem of evil and the loathesome acts of evildoers. A study of masterpieces of literature as well as an analysis of ways of the world indicate that there is evil and there are evildoers. We do come across certain redeeming acts by evil doers. We have instances of Edmunds who in spite of their own wickedness doing a good act and perhaps turning over a new leaf in their lives. But we also have examples of incorrigible Iagos who will never turn over a new leaf and who act as if their motto was 'evil, thou art my good' In the *Bhagavadgita* also we come across an extensive enumeration of two classes of people—Those who are possessed of divine virtues or the *daivisampat* and those who are members of the community which possesses *Āsurisampat*. The latter group disavow the existence of a god and regard life as a product of mutual physical love-making. They are given to violent and villainous acts. They are puffed up with passion and arrogance. They take to false ways out of delusion and gloat over their own heinous criminal acts. They assert they are themselves the lords of the universe and lead a disrespectful life. The *Gītācārya* after a very elaborate description of such persons concludes by saying that very soon these people will be consigned to hell by being first born in wickedness. They will

pass from one birth to another of such wickedness and ultimately go down into the depths of hell, never becoming competent to reach the divine. The *Gita* verses run as follows:

tānaham dviṣataḥ krūrān saṁsāreṣu narādhamān
kshipāmyajasramaśubhān āsurīṣveva yoniṣu
āsurīṁyonimāpannāḥ mūḍhā janmani janmani
māmaprāpyaiva kaunteya tato yāntyadhamāṁgatim

—Gita XVI.19,20

There is also the *Yāskaśruti* which says *sada adhoyāsyati.* In the *mokṣadharma* chapter of *Mahābharata* there is also the statement *Patālayukduṣpūromāhikleśyāte sadā* Then we have the support of sacred texts for this kind of classification.

Any attempt to explain evil will be beset with difficulties. No philosophy has been able to answer all possible objections to the question of evil. Even in the *advaitic* system the problem remains unanswered. All that we can say is: evil and misery seem to be facts of existence in this universe. From one other ethical point of view also we may look at this question. An analysis of human propensities and tendencies will make us realise that in the universe there are atleast three kinds of persons. There is the minority of people who take to religious life with seriousness and proceed further and further in the quest of the Supreme. These people with an initial endowment of spirituality never turn back. The Gita speaks of them as those who are born in the families of *yogins.* Such people are rare mortals.

athavā yogināmeva kule bhavati dhīmatām
etaddhi durlabhataram loke janma yadīdṛśam

—Gita. VI.42

Or they take birth in the family of wise yogins; a birth of this sort indeed is very hard to get. Rewards and punishments make no difference to them because they are convinced that the pursuit of a spiritual life whether there is a reward or not is an end in itself. There are also others who may be likened to those sitting on the fence. They have not ultimately thrown themselves heart and soul into the good life. They exist vascillating between the two modes of life. They are perhaps the greater in number. A way of life must consider the future of such vascillating souls. A system of rewards and punishments puts interest and terror into the minds of these and it is quite possible that instead of running into the other extreme they may take to the good life. There is also the third category of the deluded and the evil-minded ones. How far they are redeemable is a difficult question. But a way of life propounded by a thinker must consider the possible undesirable influence of such folk and by an imposition of punishments and threats here or hereafter should make the lives of these filled with terror and uneasy conscience. Whether they will turn over a new leaf or whether they will not is none of our concern. But we are concerned with a system that will give due place to all in accordance with their deserts. It is this that perhaps has been at the back of a classification of this sort attempted by Madhvācārya in accordance with earlier authorities. It is clear that such a division as also its implications are conducive to the creation of order in society and the provision of sufficient inducements to the individual for spiritual progress. Even if one is not convinced ultimately of the logicality or otherwise of this division there can be no denying the fact that it serves a very

useful and worthy purpose. The texts of *Tattva-saṁkyāna* detailing the above classification run as follows :

cetanācetanatvena bhāvópi dvividho matah
duhkhaspṛṣṭam tadaspṛṣṭamiti dvedhaivacetanam
nityāduhkhā ramānyetu spṛṣṭaduhkhā samastaśah
spṛṣṭaduhkhāh vimuktaśca duhkhasamsthā iti dvidha
duhkhasamsthā muktiyogyā ayogyā iti ca dvidhā.

The text means : Even the existent is in our opini- of two kinds-the sentient and the non-sentient, the sentient is again two fold, the misery tainted and the misery untainted. Ramā or the consort of Viṣṇu is ever free from the taint of misery while all the rest other than her are tainted with misery. The misery tainted category is again two fold as one, the liberated or those who are stationed yet in misery. The latter viz, those stationed in misery are either those who are competent for liberation or those who are incompetent for liberation.

The *Tattvaviveka* text reads as follows :

cetano cetanāśceti bhāvópi dvividhah smrtah
nityamuktaśca sṛtiyuk paratantropi cetanah
dvidhaiva śrirnityā muktah śrtiyukca dvidhamatah
muktomukta itihyarta brahmantā uttarottaram
muktaśatagunah proktāh ramātebhyokhilairguṇaih
nityam bahugunodriktā tatonantaguno harih

The text means : Even the existent is thought of as two fold - the sentient and the non-sentient. The sentient beings which are dependent are of two kinds: ever liberated and those subject to births and deaths. Ramā or Śri is the ever liberated one. The *sṛtiyuk* category or that which is subject to the cycle of births and deaths is again two fold as liberated and non-liberated. The highest among the liberated is *Brahmā* and the others exist in lower gradations. Among the liberated ones each is a hundred

times greater than the succeeding one and Ramā is in every quality superior to all these. She is possessed of innumerable good qualities surpassing her is Hari whose qualities are endless.

This reference to the superiority of liberated souls and of God as increasing hundred fold at each step is based upon the calculus of happiness (*ānanda mīmāṁsā*) we come across in the *Taittirīya upaniṣad.* The *Taittirīya upaniṣad* text runs as follows :

saiṣānandasya mīmāṁsā bhavati. yuvāsyātsādhuyuvā dhyāyakah āśiṣṭo dradhiṣṭo baliṣṭah. tasyeyam pṛthivi sarvā vittasya pūrnasyātsa eko mānuṣa ānandah. te ye śatam mānuṣa ānandah. sa eko manuṣya gandharvāṇām ānandah. śrotriyasya ca kāmahatasya. te ye śatam manuṣya gandharvāṇam ānandāh sa eko deva gandharvāṇam ānandah. śrotriyasya cā kāmahatasya. te ye śatam deva gandharvāṇam ānandāh. sa ekah pitṛnam ciralokalokānām ānandah. śrotriyasya cā kāmahatasya. te ye śatam pitrnam cira loka lokānām ānandah. sa eka ājānajānam devānam ānandah. śrotriyasya cā kāmahatasya. te ye śatamājanajānām devānamānandāh. sa ekah karmadevānām devānām ānandah. ye karmaṇā devānapi yanti. śrotriyasya cā kāmahatasya. te ye śatam karmadevānām devānāmānandāh. sa eko devānām ānandah. śrotriyasya cā kāmahatasya. te ye śatam devānāmānandāh. sa eka indrasyānandah. śrotriyasya cā kāmahatasya. te ye śatamindrasyānandah. sa eko brhaspaterānandah. śrotriyasya cā kāmahatasya. te ye śatam brhaspaterānandah. sa ekah prajāpaterānandah. śrotriyasya cā kāmahatasya. te ye śatam prajāpaterānandah. sa eko brahmaṇa ānandah. śrotriyasya cā kāmahatasya.

The text quoted above is the basis for the gradations in the bliss enjoyed by various classes of beings.

The bliss that is due to an emperor who has been liberated and who possesses all this earth filled with every kind of wealth and who is associated with Viṣṇu and possessed of such good qualities as bliss, given to continual study, ever possessed of happiness, free from changefulness and possessing great valour, such a one is considered as a person enjoying the first unit of bliss, the basis for the further calculus of bliss. The next category of person is the *manuṣya gandharva* whose bliss is considered to be a hundred fold more than that of the first mentioned. Similarly the bliss of *devagandharva*, of the pitṛs of the *ājānajāna devās*, of the *Karma devās*, of *devās*, of Indra, of Bṛhaspati, of Prajapati and finally of Brahmā are each a hundred fold more than the preceding ones. Interpreting the text Madhva says this computation applies as much to their knowledge, devotion to Viṣṇu as to their strengths also. This is to indicate that even in a state of liberation these entities do not become equal, but there is a hierarchical division amongst them. And it is for this reason that the *Tattvaviveka* text speaks of *brahmāntā uttarottaram* as also *muktāh śataguṇah proktāh*. This also makes it clear that according to Madhvācārya liberation is not independence but it is only the manifestation of one's true nature. Therefore even the liberated ones still remain dependent on the Lord.

The liberated souls are further classified into five members as follows: the gods, the sages, the manes, the emperors and the best of mortals. This five membered division applies also to the other category of those who are eligible for liberation. The difference is a matter of time.

As for those who are ineligible for liberation there is a further division into two classes viz those who are doomed to darkness and those who are fated to remain eternally in the cycle of births and deaths. Of those who are doomed to darkness there is again a two fold division into those who are already consigned to darkness or hell and those who are still going through a cycle of births and deaths. These two classes of people may be again of four kinds. They may be *daityās rakshās*, *piśācās* and the lowliest of human beings. Here again a question of time for those who are still on probation on earth. Jayatirtha raises a minor objection here by pointing out that the division of *tamoyogyās* into *prāptāndhatamasāh* or those who have been consigned to darkness is not quite proper because *yogyatā* or competence, the quality of a sentient being gets destroyed the moment the fruit of such competence is obtained. The other commentators also state the same idea.

In the *Tattvaviveka* there is a slightly different classification, the difference being one of terms used. The unliberated ones are classified into three groups as *nica*, *madhya* and *uccha*, the lowly, the middling and the higher. The higher beings are those who are competent for liberation, the middlings are those who eternally move through *saṁsāra* and the lowly are those who are doomed to eternal darkness. The purport is more are less the same.

The text of *Tattva Saṅkhyāna* runs as follows:

devarsi pitr pa narāh iti muktāstu pañcadhā
evam vimuktiyogyāśca tamogāh srtisaṁsthitāh
iti dvidhā muktyayogyāh daityah rakṣah piśācakāh
martyādhamāścaturdhaiva tamoyogyāh prakirtitāh
te ca prāptāndhatamasah sṛtisaṁsthā iti dvidhā

The text of *Tattvaviveka* runs as follows:

amuktāstrividhāstatra nica madhyoccha bhedatah

muktiyogyāstatracoccā nityāvartāstu madhyamāh
nīcānityatamoyogyāh.

Since both these works are short compendiums of Madhva Ontology not all the details one comes across in the entire body of the writings of Madhvācārya are found here. Some of them have been stated, some have been left out. The quotation from Taittiriya upaniṣad will make it clear that not all the gradations up to *Brahmā* have been explicity stated here. It does not mean that there is any contradiction either between these texts and the others or even between these two texts themselves where a slightly different classification or different terminologies are used. Further as the *Tattvaviveka* is supposed to be one which contains excerpts from Vedavyāsa's writings it is understandable that there are such minor differences. It is also possible that for reasons of comprehension and intelligibility to classes of readers certain elaborations might have been deliberately left out in these.

CHAPTER IV

THE NON-SENTIENT THE ETERNAL AND THE NON-ETERNAL

Having dealt with the various subdivisions of the sentient Madhvacāryā now returns to the possible subdivisions of the category of the non-sentient. The category of the non-sentient comprises the entire universe barring the *cetana* that has been already dealt with. Madhvācārya's division has considerable similarities with divisions of the *Sāṁkhya* school of philosophy. This is only understandable if we remember that *Vedānta* whether it is one as dealt with by Śaṇkara or Rāmānuja or Madhvācārya was more or less the culmination of the earlier speculations found in the *Nyāyā*, the *Vaiśeṣika*, the *Sāṁkhya* and other systems. Each one of these systems possessed its own emphasis. *Nyāya* for instance had greater leanings towards logic and epistemology. *Vaiśeṣikas* were more concerned with the divisions of the material universe and its ultimate constituents. The *Sāṁkyas* developed a theory of evolution and dealt with the multiplicity of universal manifestations tracing these to a primordial prakṛti which subdivided itself into the manifold items of the universe. The *Vedāntic* thinkers by virtue of their later appearance had the advantages of the work done by these. They were further wiser by the failures of the earlier thinkers. Much of what had been done by these remained to them quite sound and acceptable. Hence they have utilised them and woven these

categories with such modifications as were necessary to suit there own categorical needs. In this respect Madhvācārya also is heavily indebted to the *Sāṁkhya* and other systems.

The non-sentient category is divided into the eternal, the eternal-non-eternal and the non-eternal in the *Tattvasaṁkhyāna*. In the *Tattvaviveka* however the non-sentient is divided into only two subdivisions as the eternal and the non-eternal. It should be noted in passing the quality of eternality is also a quality possessed by the sentient, although it has not been explicity so stated. There is nothing contradictory in this. This classification into the eternal etc. indicates that in the system of Madhvācārya these are accepted in opposition to the views of Buddhists and other schools of philosophy. The Buddhists consider the universe as *kṣaṇika* or one that has a momentary existence. Therefore they do not regard anything as permanent. According to the *Sāṁkhya* system of philosophy which propounds a view of causation which is called *satkāryavadā* there is no non-eternal category at all. To them any object that is produced is not a new creation but is only a manifestation of the original cause. Most other philosophers refuse to accept the category of eternal-non-eternal because they feel that there is contradiction in such a category. Therefore to assert that there are three members of this category of the non-sentient, Madhvācārya has divided the same as here indicated. The *Tattvaviveka* division is not to be construed as something opposed to this. As it will be seen further the members that go to make up the category of the eternal-non-eternal possess from one point of view eternality and from another non-eternality. Therefore there is no contradiction involved.

Earlier we have referred to the *skandhās* or heaps or groups of the Buddhist philosophy. The Buddhist philosopher considers everything as momentary and does not give to reality any permanence. This is the doctrine of *kṣaṇika vāda* or momentariness. However this view of reality is controverted by other philosophers. The *kṣaṇika vāda* is also sometimes called *kṣanabhanga vāda* or *santāna vāda* or theory of flux. It is even referred to as *sanghāta vāda* or the theory of aggregates, the aggregate of the five fleeting *skandhās*. Thus everything spiritual as well as material is reduced to an aggregate of momentary atoms. This denial of an eteral substance is also called *pudgalanairātmya*.

In other treatises of Madhvācaryā we come across a more elaborate refutation of this view of momentariness. We also come across among the ten *padārthas* elsewhere enunciated by Madhvācārya the category known as the *aṁśin*, the whole. According to Madhva system the whole is not merely an aggregate of its constituent parts; it is something over and above it. In passing we may mention that this positing of an *aṁśin* is consistent with the view of Madhva who does not accept the Buddhist view that of *sanghātha* or the aggragates.

The *Saṁkhyās* believe that there is no non-eternal entity. They do not consider like the *Nyāyavaiśeṣikās* that the effect is entirely different from the cause. They are not *ārambhavādins* or the propounders of the view that a new object is created. According to them an effect is already found in a latent or potential state in the cause itself. What happens is that the effect becomes manifest and therefore the effect is essentially the same as its material cause. This view which is known as *satkāryavāda* as opposed to the *asatkāryavāda*

or the *ārambhavāda* of the *Nyayavaiśeṣikās* is also not acceptable to Madhvācārya. Thus in indicating that the non-sentient is divisible into the three members Madhvācārya has also pointed out that his system does not countenance either the theory of momentariness or the theory *satkāryavāda* of *Sāṁkhya*. As pointed out at the beginning of the chapter we must remember that Madhvācārya has modified the earlier positions of *Sāṁkhya, Nyāyaviśeṣika* and other schools, so that the objections levelled against these views and some of the incompatibilities are avoided.

Madhvācārya proceeds to enumerate the members of these subdivisions. They are the *Vedās*, the fifty and odd sounds of the Sanskrit language and the unmodified space or *avyākṛta akāśa*. The Vedas have been regarded as eternal and as the breath of the divine being. They are also considered *apauruṣeya*, that is to say non-human compositions. They have existed at all times. They have no beginning and no end. In regarding the Vedas as eternal and also as a non-human compositions what is implied is that these compositions do not suffer from defects that human compositions are likely to suffer from. Since the Vedas embody the inexorable laws of the universe they are eternal and infallible. This subject of *apauruṣeyatva* or the impersonal nature of the Vedas has been discussed in the other works of Madhvācārya such as the *Brahmasūtrabhaṣya* and *Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya*. Not all schools of Indian philosophy accept this view of an impersonal nature of the Vedas. Some of the schools of Indian philosophy consider the Vedas as the creation of God who is considered as a being. But the *apauruṣeyavāda* would like us believe that the Vedas are there in an unchangeable and an unchanged form both in respect of their phonetic

content and their material content. The one argument that had been advanced in favour of this is that unless the Vedas are accepted as infallible then there can be no establishment of *dharma* or righteousness. Since the Vedas embody the laws of the universe life can go on harmoniously so long as it is led in accordance with these laws of the universe. There is also the question of life going on rejecting these laws. Of course for a time it might but sooner or later there will be retribution. The forces of *dharma* so work as to produce a return to the balance that is needed. This idea finds expression in such utterances of the Lord in the Bhagavadgita as *yadā yadāhi dharmasya* etc. and *ṛtepitvām na bhavishyanti sarve*.

The sense in considering the fifty and odd sounds of language as eternal is also to indicate that speech is one of the most important aspects of life. The Vedas abound in the glorification of speech and if we just look into the history of man's evolution we will not fail to recognise how man has struggled to arrive at speech. The desire for communication is eternally present in life. The gifted poet goes even to the extent of considering non-sentient beings as possessed of the faculty for expression. He will find books in running brooks, sermons in stones. Naturally sound which is capable of expressing human thoughts, aspirations and feelings has been regarded as eternal. Since they are sounds of the Sanskrit language they have been regarded as eternal. If we just take into account how the Sanskrit language has been responsible for the birth of so many other languages of the world, perhaps we may consider the point that the sounds of this language are eternal.

The *avyākṛta ākāṣa* is a special kind of space which

is posited in the Madhva system. Time is taken into the next category of the eternal non-eternal. However if time as a concept is regarded without reference to its changeful manifestations such as a day, a month, a year etc. it is also an eternal entity. Together with space time would make up the two ideas of the older physics of space and time. The next subdivision of the eternal non-eternal consists of the *purāṇa*, time and prakrti or nature. These three members of the eternal non-eternal possess both qualities of eternality and non-eternality. Although on the surface of it, it might appear to be contradictory, there is a sense in this division. The purānās are human compositions but they embody the truths contained in the eternal Vedas. In so far as they are the compositions of human authors they are non-eternal but as compositions embodying what is imperishable they are eternal. This is not an idea unknown to literature and the arts. In literature we have both the perishable and the imperishable elements. The perishable elements consist of the body of literature such as for instance, a Hamlet's life as the life of a prince of Denmark. But the dilemma which Hamlet had to face, the agony of mind he experienced when faced with the need to take a decision, these are eternal in the sense that human beings wherever they may be and whenever they may come into existence will be able to understand and appreciate. Jayatirtha explains this category by referring to three possible types of the eternal-non-eternal. It is possible that a thing may have a beginning or a genesis but it may not have a destruction. Secondly, some part of a thing may have a birth and a death but another part might remain eternal. Thirdly, a thing in its intrinsic nature might neither have birth nor

destruction but it may have manifestations in different states.

Such a subdivision as this need not be taken as invariable because in the *Tattvaviveka* the division has been made into the eternal and the non-eternal. It is possible to explain these slightly differently also. However this classification has been done here in conformity with certain statements in the *āgamās*. Further it is also to be remembered that the whole and the part are not absolutely different. Therefore in the case of such things as purānas etc. it is possible to think of parts which are non-eternal and parts which are eternal. Hence the justification for the category of eternal non-eternal.

Regarding the eternality of the vedas an objection is raised and answered as follows: if eternality is defined as that which has neither a beginning nor an end and is not subject to modifications like *ākāṣa* or space how are we to account for the traditionally handed Vedic texts which pass from the teacher to the taught. In the case of the vedic texts handed down to the student by the teacher the eternality can only be thought of as consisting of an unbroken tradition of a text passed on from a preceptor to student. In order to meet this objection the reply that *Viṣṇu Tattvā Vinirṇaya* gives is that the Vedas as pronounced by the preceptor may be subject to such a state but since the vedas are objects of knowledge of *Iṣvara* who is omniscient they are eternal. They are present in the intellect of *Iṣvara* always. It is for this reason that the *Viṣṇu Tattva Vinirṇaya* says:

Nityāvedāsamastāsca śāśvata viṣṇubuddigāh. Hence the eternal quality of Vedas is established.

Regarding time or *kāla* it is eternal as the time

encompassing the various units such as past, present, future, day, month, year etc. The latter subdivisions possess a beginning and an end where as time as a concept continues to exist. Once again time as a category partakes of both the quality of eternality and non-eternality. In the case of *prakṛti* also it possesses both qualities of the eternal and the non-eternal as the efficient cause of all the insentient objects. *Prakṛti* by its nature has no beginning or end. But in its modifications such as the principle of *mahat* etc. it is subject to production and destruction. Hence the justification for its inclusion.

Having divided the *nityānitya* category Madhvācārya proceeds to divide the *anityā* or the non-eternal. The non-eternal is two fold: *asaṁsṛṣṭa* or that which has not been well created and *saṁsṛṣṭa* or that which has been well created. The terms *saṁsṛṣṭa* and *asaṁsṛṣṭa* are to be understood not as indicating any defect or deficiency. The *asaṁsṛṣṭa* categories as will be seen further are those that are the first evolutes of *prakrti* or matter. Naturally they have not undergone modifications to the fullest extent or that stage when there is probably no possibility of further modifications. Do the categories of *saṁsṛṣṭa* and *asaṁsṛṣṭa* respectively mean that in which a part has been created which is subject to destruction and another part which remains uncreated? The answer given is that the *asaṁsṛṣṭa* entities are the effects of the subtle efficient causes in *prakrti* and as such they are not produced by modifications of *prakrti* itself. The *saṁsṛṣṭa* entities are the products of the modifications of *prakrti*. Therefore they are regarded as *saṁsṛṣṭa*, that is to say the difference between the two is based upon this distinction viz that the *asaṁsṛṣṭa* are evolutes of an eternal entity while *saṁsṛṣṭa* are products of a non-eternal entity.

To the *asaṁsṛṣṭa* belong the following: *mahat ahaṅkāra, buddhi, manas*, the five sense organs, the five organs of action, the five *tanmātras* or subtle elements of the senses and the five elements of matter. These altogether constitute the twenty four categories well known in the *Sāṁkhya* system. As pointed out earlier the Madhva system accepts the divisions of the *Sāṁkhyas* with slight differences and modifications. These twentyfour divisions derive from *prakrti*. *Prakrti* is considered as the material cause of the material world. Time also is considered as a direct product of *prakrti* and everything else comes into existence as a result of a series of changes which *prakrti* undergoes through the categories of *mahat* etc. *Prakrti* is a *dravya* or substance, the name *māya* also is given to it and in this feminine aspect of *māya*, *prakrti* is considered as the consort of God. It is under the full control of God and as such may be thought of as the will of the lord or his strength. Other attributes which characterise *prakrti* are *doṣayuktā*, meaning impure, *jaḍa* or material, *pariṇāminī* or subject to evolution. It is also considered the cause of all bondage here. The subtle bodies, the *liṅgaśarīra* of all beings are fashioned out of the stuff of *prakrti*. *Prakrti* also is the source of the three *guṇas, satva, rajas* and *tamas*.

In the *Sāṅkhya* system the concept of *puruṣa* and *prakrti* with their special features gave birth to the difficulty of explaining creation. The blind alley in which the *Sāṅkhya* classification landed the system and the unsatisfactory explanation in terms of the *andhapaṅgunyāya* or the maxim of the blind and the lame man does not trouble Madhva thinkers. At the time

of great creation God by his creative energy gives a start to creation. His creative desire which the *āgamās* speak of, fashions out of the unmanifest three masses of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. And from these three by a sort of proportionate mixing up of the *guṇas*, the *sattva*, the *rajas* and the *tamas*, various evolutes come into being. It is in this fashion the Madhva system explains creation and various fine and gross elements of creation. The *saṁsṛṣṭa* division includes the *brahmaṇḍa* or the *aṇḍa* and everything that is within it. This completes the enfire classification of *tattvas* in a particular scheme as enunciated in the *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* and broadly also in the *Tattvaviveka*.

In order [to appreciate and understand these ultimate divisions of non-eternal categories it is desirable to go into some detail about them drawing our ideas from the system of the *Sāṁkhyas*. The system of the *Sāṁkhyas* gives an account of the twentyfour categories as follows: The first of these is *prakṛti* itself. From *prakṛti* evolves the second of *tattvas*, *mahat*. This evolution begins at the time of creation when *prakṛti* till then existing in a state of equilibrium by virtue of the fact that the three *guṇas*, although they are perpetually active remain in a state of balance, gets disturbed by a preponderance of the *sattva* element. This is the starting point of heterogeneous evolution. *Mahat* comes into being. In the *Sāṁkhya* system mahat is also equated with *buddhi* where as in the Madhva classification *buddhi* is mentioned as an evolute from *ahaṅkāra*. From the *mahat* the *ahaṅkāra* evolves and from the *ahaṅkāra* the other categories such as the *manas*, sensory organs, the motor organs and the *tanmātrās* or the subtle elements of the senses evolve. It is from

these subtle elements the five gross elements come into being. From the enumeration it should have become clear that the *Saṅkhya* subdivision has very great affinities with the division adopted by Madhva thinkers although there are certain differences. But for all practical purposes this division is good enough for explaining the world of created things.

An account of the evolution of the various created things would perhaps give the reader a complete picture and as such a brief account is here attempted. At the time of the great creation *Prakṛti* alone exists and the Lord by His Will causes three masses *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* to be produced from *Prakṛti*. These masses are supposed to exist in the following proportions: *Rājas* is double that of *tamas* and *sattva* again is double that of *rajas*. *Sattva* alone exists in two conditions: one, in a state of purity and another in a state of mixture with the other two *guṇas* namely *rajas* and *tamas*. As for the other two, *rajas* and *tamas* they are found only in a state of admixture and never in a state of purity. It is also thought that as soon as this process of evolution begins, the masses of *rajas* and *tamas* get mixed and two mixtures come into existence: the *rajas* mixture having for every part of it a hundred parts of *sattva* and a hundredth part of *tamas*; and the *tamas* mixture having ten parts of *sattva* for every part of *tamas* and one-tenth part of *rajas*. At the time of dissolution the respective parts return to the original masses.

Before proceeding further to describe how the other evolutes come into being it might well be remarked here that it is very difficult to say how far these are based on what we might today speak of as scientific observation and experimentation. However it is possible

possible to have an insight into how the *Sāṁkhyas* must have arrived at the unmanifest *Prakrti* from which proceeded all the other evolutes. This is understandable when we consider the *satkāryavāda* of the *Sāṁkhyās*. According to them as we have already mentioned earlier the cause exists and all the effects of the cause are already in the cause. No new thing comes into being; it is only a manifestation. So if we look at the world of created things and push these effects backwords into their causes then we will have to arrive at a stage when we have to posit the existence of a primordial cause or *Prakrti* from which all these should have evolved. That is to say we have to put before or posit something which is the *mūla* or the source of all created entities. In fact the term that is more often used in Indian philosophy for *Prakrti* is *Pradhāna*, what is put before or presupposed.

Whatever may be the correctness or otherwise of this account from a purely scientific point of view, it is worthwhile noting here that the Indian philosopher was seized of the problem of creation and he had to offer an explanation of the world of created things if he had to lay claims to the title of a philosopher. As the concern of philosophy is not with these details the philosoper contents himself with these by looking into them from his standpoint only. But that he was aware of the repercussions of rival explanations of the world of created things is clear from his concern with the theory of causation, of the means of right knowledge and many other things. It is quite possible for a modern philosopher like Russell to develop a philosophy taking into account the work done in science, particularly in physics, in mathematics and in the sciences of biology and psychology. But ancient

thinkers too did the same thing but with raw materials that were available to them at the time. How far they have been able to grapple with the problem and how far their generalisations can still stand the test of further research is a matter worth inquiring into.

From this somewhat long digression let us continue with the account of evolution. The first of the evolutes from *Prakrti* is the *mahat tattva*. The *mahat tattva* is an evolute in which three parts of *rajas* are mixed with one part of *tamas*. With reference to the later evolutes this is also spoken of as *sattva*. In the *Bhāgavata Tātparya* the original *sattva* is spoken of as *Śrīdevi*, the original *rajas* as *Bhūdevi* and original *tamas* as *Durgā*. *Mahālakṣmi* is supposed to have for her root all the three. The Lord is beyond all the *guṇas* and their roots.

The next evolute from *mahat* is the *ahaṅkāra* which is said to contain for every ten parts of *sattva*, one part of *rajas* and one-tenth part of *tamas*. The *manas* evolves next from the *sattva* part in the above mixture; the senses from the *rajas* part and from the *tamas* part the *tanmātrās* or the subtle essences of touch, sound, smell etc. From the *tanmātrās* the gross elements are produced. Since the *ahaṅkāra* possesses this three-fold capacity to produce evolutes, it is referred to as *vaikārika*, *taijasa* and *tāmasa*. In the *Tattva Saṁkhyāna* it is stated that in addition to the *manas* the *buddhi tattva* also is supposed to evolve from *ahaṅkāra*. There seems to be some seeming divergences in the accounts in the Madhva texts and as it is a matter for elaboration it is not attempted here.

In passing it is useful to note that the term *buddhi* may be used and has been used to refer to *buddhi* as knowledge and *buddhi* as category. So is the case with

manas, which may be both a category and a sense organ. As a sense organ it is regarded as eternal non-eternal. It is said to be *nitya* or eternal in God, *Lakṣmi*, *Brahma* and all other souls as their own essence or *svarūpa*. The non-eternal *manas* may be regarded as the *vrttis* or functions. The *Tattva Saṁkhyāna* and the *Tattvaviveka* do not elaborate on this point.

The account of the evolution of the *tanmātra* is as follows:

There are five *tanmatrās* which are named after the distinguishing qualities of the five senses. They are:

1. *Śabda tanmātra* or the essence of sound.
2. *Sparśa tanmātra* or the essence of touch.
3. *Rupa tanmātra* or the essence of form or colour.
4. *Rasa tanmātra* or the essence of taste.
5. *Gandha tanmātra* or the essence of smell.

These are said to exist in a subtle form and from these subtle ones come into being the grosser elements. The first of the *tanmātrās* is *śabda tanmātra* and from this emerges the element *ākāśa*. The next thing to evolve is air which arises out of the combination of the *śabda tanmātra* and the *sparśa tanmātra*. As such it has both the qualities of sound and touch while the first one, *ākāśa* has only one distinguishing quality namely sound. The next step is the evolution of fire which is a result of the three *tanmātrās, śabda, sparṣa rūpa*; as such it has three qualities of sound, touch and form or colour. The fourth element water is produced by four *tanmātras*: *śabda, sparśa, rūpa* and *rasa tanmātras* Naturally it possesses all the four qualities of sound, touch, form or colour and taste. Lastly evolves the earth which has the five qualities of sound, touch, form taste and smell. Five *tanmātras* are responsible for this production. From these come into being the manifold

universe. The *upaniśads* contain also similar correspondent accounts though we do have varying accounts in them. There is the account as found in the following: *ākaśadvāyuh, vāyoragnih, agnerāpah, adbhyah prthivī* etc. There are also such accounts as found in the *smrti* literature—*apa eva sasarjādau tāsu vīryamavāsrjat* etc.

But every philosopher takes care to present a view of the world and the place of each and everything in it. It must be said to the credit of Sriman Madhvācārya that he has taken care to present a consistent cosmology and cosmogony based on the *sadāgama* or the dependable and trustworthy texts.

The one significant thing in the writing of Sriman Madhvācārya is his meticulous care for every detail found in the large body of texts both revealed and the remembered. Every book of his surprises us with quotations from wide and varied sources. Further he has also taken care to see that a consistent view emerges out of these texts, however seemingly contradictory they may appear to be. One more thing that must be attributed to the genius of Sriman Madhvācārya is his bold classification of texts into *sadāgamās* and *durāgamās*, reliable and dependable texts and texts that are undependable. He reiterates this point that the ultimate reality is realisable only through the *sadāgamās*. No earlier writer or thinker in India seems to have been impressed by the need for sorting out the so called texts into the dependable ones and the untrustworthy ones. In a sense we might consider Sriman Madhvācārya as one of the bold thinkers who initiated textual criticism. Although this digression might appear not strictly relevant in this chapter we have indulged in it to point out how Sriman Madhvācārya was very

particular and careful in his efforts at system building. He has carefully looked into the statements found in various of these texts and built out of that material a consistent philosophy that stands justification on the basis of a set of examining and substantiating principles. Whatever therefore might be the value we give to the divisions particularly of those things relating to the material world it must be pointed out that Sriman Madhvācārya has attempted his system building in conformity with the most exacting principles of such an undertaking. Perhaps no ther commentator has supplemented his commentary with all the wealth of substantiating qualities. This becomes very clear in his *Upaniṣad Bhāṣyas* where he quotes profusely either to substantiate a thesis found in the *upaniṣadic* statement or even to substantiate his choice of a particular word that has been the subject of controversy. In the above we have for want of space refrained from indicating the sources relied upon by Sriman Madhvācārya for such division and classification. However the reader must have noticed how we have referred to *āgama virodha* etc., in some of the places. In his more elaborate treatises these have been indicated at some length and the commentators of Madhvācārya have quoted these sources in full. In passing therefore we might state that Madhvācārya has spared no pains to develop a consistent system out of the wealth of material that he was able to lay hands upon. It is this attitude of looking into all available knowledge and the fidelity that Sriman Madhvācārya demonstrates to the disciplines of philosophical enquiry that should not be lost sight of.

CHAPTER V

CATEGORIES—AN EXAMINATION

In the previous chapter we have refrained from indicating the *Tattvaviveka* text that concerns itself with the subject dealt with in it. That is because the *Tattvaviveka* text is slightly divergent from the *Tattvasaṅkhyāna* and takes up also a subject which the latter text does not. We shall first quote the text of the *Tattvaviveka* and then deal with the additional matter which it has incorporated. The relevant text runs as follows:

dvidhaivācetanam matam
nityānityātvabhedena deśah kālah śrutis tathā
bhūtendriya prāṇa guṇah sukṣmarūpañca nityakam
yeṣām vikāro nityassyāt nityā eveti cetanāh
guṇa kriyā jāti pūrvāh dharmah sarve'pi vastunah
rūpameva dvidham tacca yāvadvastu ca khanditam
khandite bheda aikyañca yāvadvastu na bhedavat.
kāryakāraṇayoścaiva tathaiva guṇa tadvatoh
kriyā kriyāvatostadvattathā jāti viśeṣayoh
viśiṣṭa śuddhayoscaiva tathaivaṁśāṁśinorapi

The text means:

The *acetana* or the non-sentient category is twofold only: the eternal and the non-eternal. The eternal non-sentient ones are *deśa* or the *avyākrta ākāśa* or pure vaccuity, (a special kind of *ākāśa* admitted by Sriman Madhvācārya); Time; the Vedas and the fity sounds of the Sanskrit language; the elements (five in number), the senses (the fiye *karmendriyas* and the five *jñanendriyas*), the *manas* or the mind, *prāna* or the

vital breath, the three qualities (*sattva rajas* and *tamas*) the *tanmātras*, *mahat*, *ahaṅkāra* etc. are all eternal. The transformations and the manifestations of the above entities are to be regarded as the non-eternal ones. All sentient ones are to be regarded as eternal. Such things as *guṇa* or qualities, *kriyā* or activity, *jāti* or generic quality, *sādṛśya* or similarity, *viśiṣṭa* or the entity possessing special characteristics, etc are to be also included herein. *Rūpa* is two fold: that which is coterminus with the object or that which gets severed from the object. *Rūpa* that does not exist till the object exists is to be considered as having the relation of *bhedābheda* or difference-non-difference. But in the case of such qualities as are coterminus with the object they are essentially non-different from the object. All manifestations are of the nature of the qualities that are severed, that is to say, they exist in the relation of *bhedābheda* or difference-non-difference. These are the effect and the cause, the quality and the possessor of it or the substance, the activity and the agent or that which has activity, generic quality and the specific characteristics, the one possessing a special characteristic and the pure one and finally the part and the whole.

From the above it must now be clear that the *Tattvaviveka* raises certain questions as the classification of *tattvas* would remain incomplete without even a passing mention of these. We have earlier given an account of the ten *padārthās* of Madhva philosophy and so have we referred to the seven *padārthās* of the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣikās* wherein we find such items as the *guṇa*, *karma*, *jāti*, *samavāya*, *viśeṣa* etc. Naturally Madhva ontology must also have something to say of these things: whether they are accepted as such or whether they are accepted in slightly modified

form. It is easy to surmise from the bundling of all these into a few verses at the end and the summary manner in which it has been dealt with that the system of Madhva does not regard them with the same seriousness as it has done the others. *Guṇa* for instance, the qualities, twentyfour in number enumerated in the following aphoristic statement of one of the *Nyāya* compendiums is not regarded as in any way entirely different from the substance and an explanation is offered. The qualities therein enumerated are:
rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparśa, saṅkhyā, parimāṇa, pṛthaktva, saṁyoga, vibhāga, paratva,aparatva, gurutva, dravatva, sneha, śabda, buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveśa, prayatna, dharma, adharma, saṁskāraścaturviṁśati guṇāh.

Form, taste, smell, touch, number, size, separateness, contact, division, exclusiveness and inclusiveness of classes, heaviness, liquidity, cohesion, sound, intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, goodness, impressions, these twenty four are the qualities.

As will be seen the enumeration of the qualities as done by the *Nyāya* contains not only the qualities pertaining to objects but also to the mental ones. It is not to be supposed that Madhva thinkers accept this division in toto. While they do not deny the existence of qualities they have their own ways of accounting for them and also for according to them the status that they ontologically deserve.

Similarly the other category of kriyā or karma has been dealt with in the Nyāya system and they are said to be of five kinds. The Tarkasaṁgraha definition and classification which have been used above for the qualities may again be quoted here for convenience. It reads as follows:

utkṣepanāpakṣepanākuñcanaprasāraṇagamanāni
pañca karmāṇi.

Throwing up, warding off, constriction, extension and movement these are the five kinds of karma.

The *Nyāya* school includes all other kinds of *karma* within these five. For instance elsewhere we find the following types of *karma, bhramaṇa, syandana, recana, urdhvajvalana, tiryaggamana.* But all these are included within the category of *gamana* itself and not separately mentioned.

It should be noted in passing that in the older way of learning a student used to go through some of the elementary treatises of Nyāya etc. and then would come to the study of the *Vedānta* and as such he generally was acquainted with these classifications of the other schools and could easily proceed further when modifications and regroupings were made by the system builders. The summary manner in which these have been dealt with also point to the same.

The other categories such as the *Jāti* or *Sāmānya* accepted by the *Nyāya* school is also accepted by Madhvācārya. *Samavāya* which is accepted as a special kind of relationship by the Nyaya school is however not eccepted by Madhvācārya. It is supposed to be an enernal relationship subsisting between *dravya* and *guṇa*, part and the whole, action and the thing that has action, generic quality and the object that possesses this, eternal elements and their specific features. As has already been stated earlier these entities such as the *guṇa* and *dravya, kriyā* and *kriyāvat* are regarded as not two distinct sets of things but a relationship of non-difference in one kind of qualities and a relationship of difference non-difference for another kind of qualities

has been accepted, thus making the category of *samavāya* superfluous.

Now to continue with the enumeration and explanation offered by Jayatīrtha. Having stated that these things such as qualities and actions exist in two forms of relationships, *khandita* or difference and *atyantābheda* or absolute non-difference, Sriman Madhvācārya illustrates them. Jayatīrtha has elaborated the same in his '*ṭīka*' and we shall give an account of his elucidation here for fullness.

The first of these is the relationship between the cause and the effect, the *kāraṇa* and *kārya*. *Kārya* is also termed *upādeya* in *Vedānta* and the *kāraṇa* is termed *upādana*, In an effect like the cloth the threads which go to produce the cloth are known as the *upādana kārana* and the cloth itself is the *upādeya* or the *kārya*, the effect. As earlier mentioned Madhva accepts a relationship of difference-non-difference between these. His theory of causation is different from the Nyāya school which holds to the *ārambhavāda* meaning thereby the effect is wholly different from the cause and also the *satkāryavāda* of the *Sāṁkhyas* which regards that the cause and the effect are one and the same, the effect having already been present in the cause. As both theories have their own drawbacks, Madhva has propounded a theory that accepts the possibility of difference and non-difference between the cause and the effect. The Buddhists who hold the view that the effect such as the cloth is nothing but an aggregate of the *paramāṇus* or the atoms and the *Nyāya* thinkers who consider the effect to be different totally from the cause are both dismissed as holding an untenable view of causation. The term *khandita* or severed has been used here to point out that there is

not absolute identity between the cause and the effect. For instance even prior to the coming into being of the cloth the threads do exist. Hence it is only reasonable to assert that the threads which are the cause of the cloth possess a relationship of difference as well as one of non-difference.

The same holds true of the *guṇas*. If the qualities are those that persist till the object does then they are non-different. In the case of qualities that do not so persist they are to be regarded as different. For instance the green colour of a mango disappears as soon as the mango ripens. The relationship between the green colour and the mango is one of difference. Two views again are controverted here. The view that the atoms are of the nāture of *rūpa* or form etc. of the Buddhists and as such there is no need to consider that there are entities like *guṇa* and that which has these *guṇās*, a view of the Buddhists who reduce every *Dharma* into the five *skandhas* mentioned earlier, is also not accepted. Similarly the view that the *guṇa* and the *guṇin* are two distinct entities is also rejected here.

Similarly the relationship between *kriya* and the *kriyavat*; action and the one that has action. Both kinds of relationships are to be thought of here also. *Bhedābheda* and *atyantābheda* or difference-non-difference and absolute non-difference. The instances are: cloth and its fluttering movement. For there is always the possibility of the cloth remaining stationary and without any movement. As for the relationship between the sentient and actions of these there is the relationship of absolute non-difference. It might be objected that activity is non-eternal and how then can a relationship of *abheda* be predicated of it. In answer to these, commentators of Jayatīrtha point out that the

kriya of the Lord is eternal and on the same reasoning the *kriya* of the *cetanās* also is to be regarded as eternal. This has been elaborated by Jayatīrtha in the *Nyāya-sudha*.

The relationship that has been mentioned next in the above aphoristic verse of Sriman Madhvācārya is the one between *Jāti* and the individual. The relationship between brahminhood and the corporeal lump that is so spoken of is one of difference and non-difference; for, it is quite possible that a person might lose his brahminhood by committing a heinous crime or sinful act. In this case there is the possibility of difference as well as non-difference. Difference the moment there is the loss of brahminhood consequent on the commision of a sin and non-difference as long as the person lives in keeping with Vedic injunctions. Srinivāsatīrtha, a commentator on Jayatīrtha points out that other instances might also be thought of. It is possible that by contact with *sparśamaṇi* a piece of iron might be converted into gold. In the commentary of Vyāsarāya, entitled *Mandāramañjarī* on the Tīka of Jayatīrtha there is an interesting discussion. Srinivāsatīrtha quotes a maxim which is also quoted by Vyāsarāya.

māsena śūdrobhavati rasavikrayena

That is to say that a brahmin who betakes himself to the selling of such things as ghee, oil and salt loses his brahminhood. The objection raised by the school of Kumārila Bhatta to this sort of interpretation of the above text is that they only refer to the actions and they suggest that such actions are heinous. This is effectively met by Vyāsarāya by pointing out that such a position would be untenable. The word *brahmaṇa* or *śūdra* or *kśātriya* is always understood as referring

to the *Jati* and rejecting this *swārtha* or natural sense it is not right to take up any other sense unless there is sufficient ground for it. He also shows how such an acceptance of a different sense would lead to difficulties in explaining certain other injunctions and instructions such as that the brahmin should obtain fire in the season of spring; for, even the others are not precluded from engaging themselves in this act. Then there is the instance of Visvāmitra and Trisanku, by virtue of a boon or a curse acquiring or losing brahminhood. Vyāsarāya points out also that such an interpretation would conflict with the views found in the *Apaśudrādhikarana* of the *Brahmasūtra*. If such words as these are not to be regarded as referring to the *jāti* then all such injunctions meant for these would be meaningless.

The other pairs mentioned also possess these characteristics of difference-non-difference and absolute non-difference. Jayatīrtha elaborates them with examples as follows: In the case of the *viśiṣṭa* and the *śuddha*, the relationship is one of difference-non-difference and absolute non-difference. Taking the instance of a mountain on fire we may speak of the mountain as the *viśiṣṭa* because it is qualified by the fact of being on fire. It is possible for the *viśiṣṭa* to exist by itself. It may be on fire or may not be. Hence it can be said to exist in both relations. But in the case of Viṣṇu and his characteristic *sarvajñatva* or omniscience the relationship is one of absolute non-difference.

In the case of the *amśa* or the parts and *amśin* or the whole also the same sets of relations are to be accepted. If we look at the relationship of one part to the whole then there is the relationship of difference-non-difference. But when we think of all the parts and the whole then there is non-difference. It is not to be

questioned that there is nothing other than cause itself and hence where is the need for accepting a whole that is other than the aggregate of its parts. What is meant is, as Madhva has already referred to the *Kārya* and the *Kāraṇa* and the *amśa* and *amśin* may again be related as the *kārya* and the *kāraṇa*. The reply given is that we perceive the whole to be different from the parts. One more point raised is that if we do not accept the *amśa* and *amśin* then one will have to think of the *ākāśa* also as having parts. If it be asked why we should accept such a thing then it becomes difficult to explain how there could be in the *ākāśa* the existence as well as the non-existence of the body of a bird. We can answer this by suggesting that the relationship of contact, in this case of the existence and non-existence with the *ākāśa* is one that can coexist with its absence. That is to say that existence and non-existence could still be in the same substratum. This is contradictory. Else we have to accept also the possibility of the absence of contradiction between an existent and a non-existent everywhere. If it is argued that there is no contradiction involved at all if we accept the possibility of the existence and the non-existence of a bird's body in space because we may explain the existence and non-existence being in different parts, it may be answered that by this the opponent would be accepting our own position. In order to avoid this acceptance the opponent might argue that he is accepting the part or *amśa* as an *upādhi* or conditioning factor only and not as a natural one. To refute this the Madhva thinkers ask the question: how is this conditioning factor related to the *ākāśa*? If like the body of the bird it is related at one part to the *ākāśa* then the opponent has tacitly accepted the category

of *amśa*. The mode of forcing the opponent to accept this is indicated by Srinivasa Tīrtha as follows: If you say that the part is only to be regarded as an *upādhi* or conditioning element, then how does this conditioning factor produce the difference of parts? Is it by being related to the *ākāśa* or is it by not being related to it. It cannot be the second. In the case of the first alternative, it is again to be asked: is it by being related to the entire *ākāśa* or to just one part of it? In the first case if the entire *ākāśa* is encompassed by the conditioning factor it cannot produce the difference of a part. In the latter case that is when we say that it is by being related to a part or one place only then we will find no end point at all. Hence one is forced to accept the naturalness of this category of *amśa*. What does it matter if we say that the *ākāśa* has parts. Then we are invariably led to accept the two *aṁśa* and *aṁśin* in contradistinction with the *kārya* and *kāraṇa*. Further *ākāśa* is not also the efficient cause of anything.

Thus an account of other categories has been done and certain things have been accepted and certain others rejected depending on their rationality. For instance the relation of inherence or *samavāya* is not accepted. So is the idea of qualities being in many as also the assumption that *Jāti* is eternal are also rejected. If this were not so then everything would have been not different at all.

Though strictly what is now going to be referred to here would not fall within the scope of this chapter and also under the remarks based on the texts and its commentaries for the sake of a certain completeness these are taken up here. The material is drawn from other sources.

One of Madhva's distinct conrributions is the

positing of the *sākṣi* or the sense of intuition. As the function of this *sākṣi* is a matter that the epistemological texts deal with the same has been not referred to in these texts. Madhva posits an internal sense of intuition which can directly perceive pleasure and pain, ignorance, time and space. The sense data appearing through the respective sense organs are directly perceived by this *sākṣi*. Further all things that transcend the senses are directly perceived by this *sākṣi*. As S. N. Dasgupta puts it: 'To consider *sākṣi jñāna* as a special source of intuitive knowledge, indispensable particularly for the perception of time and space, is indeed one of the special features of the Madhva system.' According to Madhva the validity of sense knowledge is realised through the sense of intuition. Further the perception of one's own self as ego is due to this *sākṣi*. According to Madhva the perception of one's self is not due to one's mental activity because, had it been so, then it would have been possible to doubt one's self through such an activity. But this never happens and hence the *sākṣi* invariably leads us to unerring knowledge and wherever there is the possibility of error and the functioning of the discriminating process, this has to be attributed to mental processes only.

The positing of the appreceiver or witness or *Sākṣi* who inspects the data provided by the senses and more importantly as the source of intuitive knowledge which is indubitable-for example such knowledge of one's own existence etc,—is also recognised by Ninian Smart in the work, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy. The author equates this in Western terms with the faculty of a priori cognitions. *Sākṣi* or witness is not something common to different persons

as in the Non-Dualist schools but is individual to each person.

Although there is not much said about the Jivas or the life-monads in these two texts it is desirable to say something about the same in order to make an account of Madhva Ontology complete. Madhva who operates on the five-fold set of distinctions, between the Lord and the life-monads; between the Lord and the material substance; between the *Jiva* or life monad and the material substance; between life-monad and life-monad; and between material substance and material substance; posits the existence of innumerable Jivas or life-monads. These *Jivās* are thought of as images or *Pratibimbas* in the Madhva tradition. *Jivas* or life-monads are real but they have no existence apart from the Lord and are dependent on Him. They are subject to the Will of the Lord and as such they cannot behave independently of Him. The relationship between the Lord and the *Jivas* is different from the relationship that exists between the Lord and material substance. During the time of transmigration the *Jīvas* are clothed in material aspects and by their individual ignorance they appear to be undergoing change but considered in themselves apart from these they are changeless. Hence the relationship between the Lord and the *Jivas* and the distinction between them does not consist in the transformation. But the fate of the *Jīvas* is determined by the Lord in conformity with the veil of ignorance that envelopes these *Jivas*. This veil of ignorance over the intelligence of the *Jivas* is the cause of the round of rebirths. Thus the circumstances which determine whether a life-monad is going to attain release or suffer damnation are affected by the activity of the Lord and in this sense they are dependent

whereas the Lord remains free from any such implication.

The *Jivas* are regarded as similar to the Lord since they have will and feeling but as stated earlier in the book these wills are subject to the Will of the Lord. The idea that these are reflections of the Lord has to be qualified also by stating that they do not suffer destruction as ordinary reflections of the world.

Ninian Smart detects in this ontological account of the Madhva school a closer resemblance to Jainism than to Christianity. While discounting any Christian influence on Madhva the author thinks that there is a great similarity between the plurality of selves closely packing the cosmos a senunciated by the Jain schools and Madhva. Daulism presupposes the existence of plurality of selves as well as their not being united in the single Holy Power underlying the visible world. Another point that is made out is that there is an abalogous hierarchy of gods in both systems. Madhva assigns various roles to a host of traditional gods, each possessing cerain powers of officially administering the Lords commands, arranged in a fixed hierarchy.

Darkness is considered as a substance and not just the negation of light. In fact the *Nyāya* treatises refer to the question of *Tamas* as being a separate entity. *Tamas* as the *daśama dravya*. According to the *Nyāya Tamas* is not a *dravya* but just the absence of light. In Madhva however it is raised to the status of a *dravya*.

It is also significant to note that the two categories of *ahaṁkara* and *buddhi* are regarded as subtle material stuff and they are referred to as being quantitatively measured and understood. The *ahaṁkāra* is also that through the functioning of which the unreal is thought

of as the real. *Buddhi* of course is that faculty which enables us to come to a decision. It is *niścayatmikā*.

The account of the categories in this and the previous chapter has been based, in addition to the *Tattvaviveka* text quoted in the beginning of this chapter on the following aphoristic verses in the *Tattvasaṁkhyāna*. However considerable material has been drawn from other sources also. The *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* text reads as follows:

nityānityavibhāgena tridhaivācetanam matam
nityā vedāh purāṇādyāh kālah prakṛti revaca
nityānityam tridhā proktam anityaṁ
dvividham matam.
asamsṛṣṭañca samsṛṣṭam asamsṛṣṭam mahanaham.
buddhirmanahkhāni daśamātrā bhutāni pañca ca
samśṛṣṭamaṇḍam tadgañca samastam samprakīrtitam.

The text means:

The non-sentient category is three-fold: the eternal, non-eternal and the eternal-non-eternal. The eternal consists of the Vedas etc. The Purāṇas, Time, Prakṛti belong to the eternal-non-eternal category and they are three in number. The non-eternal is again twofold: one that is not so well created and two, the one that has been well or fully created. The asamsṛṣṭa or the not-well-created category has *mahat*, *ahaṇkāra*, *buddhi*, *manas*, the five *bhūtas* or elements, and the ten *indriyās* namely the five *karmendriyās* and the five *jñānendriyās*. The samsṛṣta category consists of the *Brahmāṇḍa* and all that is in it.

CHAPTER VI

WHY A KNOWLEDGE OF TATTVA SASTRA

The residuum of dissatisfaction troubles and perplexes man. Whatever may be his earthly power and glory, whatever he may have been blessed with or obtained by self-effort and achievement, yet there remains a residuum of discontent which can only vanish after realisation. This discontent, this lingering longing for something indefinable has been ably put in the Gita verses:

rasavarjaṁ rasopyasya param dṛṣṭvā nivartate.

Excepting that residuum of taste everything disappears and even this once the person has the vision of the Ultimate.

Again,

yam labdhvā naparam lābham manyate nādhikam tatah
yasminsthitohi duhkhena gurunāpi vicālyate
tamvidhyādduhkhasaṁyogaviyogam yoga sanjñitam.

Having obtained which one does not consider any other object as greater than this; stationed in which one does not get perturbed even by the most poignant of sorrows; that should be known as yoga, a state wherein one is severed from that contact with pain.

But what is this state that makes man so free from all impact of misery, obtaining which he longs for nothing else; wherein he has no residuum of desires left. Various have been the answers to these questions and they have been dependent on the nature of the philosophy that has attempted it. In this small

introduction we have endeavoured to place before the reader an account of the cosmology and cosmogony to some extent of the Madhva system and we have dealt with its ontology. This account of Madhva ontology, we have earlier indicated, has not been done as a piece of idle curiosity. It has not been done with that scholastic disinteredness that characterises much of the writings of philosophers in the West. On the other hand it has been done in the true spirit of the *darśanakāra* in India who would fain indulge in an act that is not directed towards some purpose. Nor do these two texts which we have used for this account attempt any such theoretical account of the *tattvās* purely for the sake of idle curiosity. Hence both of them have begun with the assertion of the ultimate purpose of such an account and they also end on the same note.

In brief it may be said that it is only when man realises his true nature and position in the order of created things and the scope of his achievements that he can attain this state of freedom from discontent and the enjoyment of bliss that is his nature. For this he needs must find his true place in the entire order of created things so that he may know what his relations are with them and with his maker or creator. This then will determine for him the coure of action or discipline that might lead him to the ultimate goal. Hence the need for the study of *Tattvaśāstra*.

The *Tattvasaṁkhyāna* text concludes with the following aphoristic verses:

> sṛṣṭisthitiḥ samhṛtiśca niyomo' jñānabodhane
> bandho mokṣaḥ sukhamduhkhamāvṛttirjyotirevaca
> viṣṇunāsya samastasya samāsavyāsayogataḥ

From Viṣṇu alone arise all these things, some in entirety and some in such measure as is applicable to

each of them from among the following: creation, protection, dissolution, impulsion in activities, ignorance, knowledge, captivity in the web of *prakṛti*, liberation, pleasure, pain, external darkness and light.

The *Tattvaviveka* text reads as follows though it does not enumerate these items:

> ya etat paratantrantu sarvameva hareḥ sadā
> vaśamityeva jānāti samsārānmucyate hi saḥ.

He who understands that all these dependent entities are ever in the control of Hari, will be released from the cycle of births and deaths.

All this knowledge by itself is not of any use but only when it is understood in the proper light as indicating the dependence of everything on the Lord and the need to adopt the requisite attitude and also the pursuit of discipline that it will conduce to the ultimate release of man. That is why the *śrutis* declare as follows:

> dve vidye veditavye parācāparāca tatra ye vedā
> yānyaṅgāni yānyupāngāni yānipratyaṅgāni sāparā.
> atha parā yayā tadakṣaramadhigamyate.

Further

> ṛgādya aparā vidyā yadā viṣṇornavācakāḥ
> tā eva paramā vidyā yadā viṣṇostu vācakāḥ

The *śruti* means:

It is desirable that two systems of learning should be known: *parā*, the Supreme and the *aparā*, the lower. Here those that are the *Vedas*, their *aṅgās* or parts, *upāngas* or further subdivisions, and *pratyāṅgas* or counterdivisions—these are encompassed in the *aparā* vidya. But the Supreme learning is that by which the Imperishable is known.

The *smṛti* text quoted means:

As long as the *Ṛgveda* and the others do not

declare vocally *Viṣṇu* they are to be regarded as *aparā* or lower learning. But when they become vocal of *Viṣṇu* they become *parā* or the Supreme learning.

It is therefore very clear that the object of all this knowledge about the *tattvas* should ultimately lead us to the realisation that *Viṣṇu* is the Supreme Lord and that it is by His Will all else exists and it is through His desire that the individual acquires his true nature by shedding the *āvarāṇa* or the covering of ignorance.

Jayatirtha commenting on the aphoristic verses of Sriman Madhvācārya answers some of the objections. When we speak of *sṛṣṭi sthiti samhāra* etc. does this not conflict with the earlier statements that some of the things are eternal? It is for this reason that the words *samāsa* and *vyāsa*, meaning thereby in short and in elaboration, have been used. It means that these capacities and activities of the Lord are to be applied to the various categories in such manner as is consistent with their nature. All these have bee grouped together and stated here for convenience but it does not mean that all these apply to every one of them. If among these *dharmās* only a few apply to some, a few only are meant. If among these many apply to some of the *tattvas* then many are meant. Elaborating these further Jayatirtha says, in every respect *svarūpa* and *svabhāva*, essential form and nature of things are all dependent on the Lord. Protection or the condition of existence here and impulsion in actions is applicable to all. Creation and dissolution is for the eternal-non-eternal and the non-eternal things. Ignorance or *ajñāna* of the Bhava variety is for the category of the misery-tainted. Ignorance which is the absence of knowledge is for all. Knowledge is for the *cetana* or the sentient. Happiness is for all except those who have been cast into hell.

Misery is for all except those who are free from misery.

When the authoritative texts speak of *Brahma* and *Rudra* as possessing the functions of creation etc. how then can we speak of Viṣṇu as one who has these functions and powers? The answer is that Viṣṇu alone is independently capable of these and others are merely his agents. As for the revealed texts that indicate that Brahma and others are the creators etc. of the universe no contradiction is involved because it is said that these are agents of those activities at the behest of Viṣṇu. In support of this *Srīnivāsatīrtha* quotes the following:

nimittamātramīśasya viśvasarganirodhayoh
hiranyagarbhah śarvaśca kālakhya rupiṇastava
tatra tatra sthito viṣṇuh tattacchaktih prabodhayan
eka eva mahāśaktih kurute survamañjasā
brahmanisthitósrjadviṣṇuh sthitvā rudretvabhakṣayat
pṛthaksthito jagatpati tadbrahmādyāhvayo harih.

The text clearly affirms that Viṣṇu stationed in these deities is responsible for such tasks as creation, protection and dissolution. He is the one Great power who gets all these things done. Whether it is *Brahmā* or *Rudrā* or *Kāla*—all these are only His own forms.

Why are the Jīva hosts bound and how do they get liberated? Srinivasatīrtha commenting on the *Tīkā* of Jayatīrtha appends a rather longish account of *Tattva-rahasya* which is worth looking into in some detail.

Avidyā or *Ajñāna* is regarded in Madhva philosophy as a *bhāva* and not as a negative entity. This is because it is this *avidyā* which clouds or covers the *Jīva* as an *āvaraṇa* and it is because of this covering that the *Jīva* is rendered incapable of experiencing that bliss which is by nature its own. If *avidyā* is regarded as a negation then it becomes difficult to speak of the same

as functioning as a cover or cloak. Hence it has been accepted as a positive entity. The relevant texts both revealed and the remembered ones are quoted. They are:

anādi māyayā suptah
anādyavidyābaddhattvājjivājānanti no harim.

By virtue of the *Māyā* which is beginningless he appears as if in sleep.

The individual self does not recognise Hari because of the binding imposed by the beginningless *avidyā*.

This *bhāva* form of *avidyā* is nothing but the *Prakṛti* composed of the three gunas, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. This *Prakṛti* is known as *avidyā* because it eclipses the natural knowledge of the individual, and as such is in opposition to *vidyā*, hence it is designated *avidyā*. In the *Nyāyasudha* Sri Jayatirtha says:

atah kāmakarmatiriktam māyā avidyā prakrtirityādiśabdabhidheyam anādyeva kimapi dravyam svarūpacaitanyāvaram kamaṅgikāryamityuktvā atah parameśvara eva sattvādiguṇa mayyā vidyavirodhitvena avidyaya svadhinayā prakrtyācintya adbhutayā svaśaktyā ca svaprakaśamapi jivasvarupacaitanyam ācchadayatityuktam.

Therefore it is desirable to accept some positive substance, a beginningless entity variously designated us *Māyā*, *avidya*, *prakrti* which is however other than *Kāma* or desire and *karma* or activity. Further the Supreme Lord Himself by His inscrutable and terrible power exercising control over this *Prakrti* composed of the three guṇas such as the *satva* etc, known also as *avidyā* because it is opposed to *Vidyā* causes the *Jīva* to have its self-luminosity clouded.

It is this *bhāva* form of *avidyā* which is the cause of the bondage of the individual soul. This bondage is due to *avidyā* which covers up its natural luminosity.

It is interesting to note that the individual self is encased in all in seven fortresses as it were and it is only by breaking through these seven that the *Jīva* becomes freed. The seventh of the encasements being the Will of the Lord, hence it will not be right philosophically to speak of the individual self breaking this *āvaraṇa*. It should come through the grace of the Lord Himself. Hence it is said in the *Kathopaniṣat*.

yamevaiṣa vrnute tena labhyah.

The ultimate is realised only by him who has been the recepient of Divine grace.

What then are these *āvaraṇas* or the encasements of the individual soul? The first of these encasements is the *avidyā* variously known as *Māyā* or *Prakṛti*, Which is composed of the three *guṇas*, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It is said in the *Bhagavata*:

badhnanti nityadāmuktam māyinam prakrtim guṇāh

The second of the encasements is *Kāma* or Desire. The *Gita* speaks of this *āvaraṇa* in the following verse:

avrtam jñānametena jñānino nita vairiṇā
kāmarupena kaunteya duspūreṇānalena ca

This knowledge is covered by *Kāma* or desire which is the eternal enemy of the wise and it is like fire that never would be quenched.

In the *Bhāgavata* also it is stated:

tatha kāmanibaddhoyamuccāyacatayā bhraman.

That is, a person who is bound by desire moves up and down under its spell.

The third of the encasements is the *prārabdhakarma*, the effects of past actions that have begun to work in

man's life. In the *Anuvyākhyānā* Sriman Madhvācārya says:

ānadi karmaṇā baddho jivassamsāra mandale
vāsudevecchayā nithyam bhramatiti hitadvacah

That is, the individual soul bound by the beginningless *karma* by the will of *vāsudeva* roams about in the circle of *samsāra*. It is also said that the individual souls are bound by the *avidyā*, *kāma* and *karma*.

Then there are the two named as *duṣṭaprakrti*, one which covers up its own *guṇas* and the other the *parama*. The terms used are *svagunacchādikāprakrti* and *paramācchadikaprakriti*. The sixth one is the *sūkṣmadeha* or the *lingaśarira*.

The *Bhagavatā* says:

evampañcavidham lingam trivrtśodaṣavistaram
eṣa cetanayā yukto jiva ityabhidiyate
anena puruṣo dehanupādatte vimuñcati

These six encasements have to be destoyed if the invividual is to become capable of experiencing its self-luminosity and bliss. Of these excepting the *prārabdhakarma* the other five are removed by *apārokṣajñāna* or the direct realisation of the Supreme. The *karma* encasement can be got rid off only through *bhoga* or letting the effects have their sway here. They have to be experienced and thus written off as it were.

But even with the breaking of these six encasements the individual does not obtain release. There is still the seventh *āvaraṇa* and that is the one of God's will. For the *Nyāya Sudha* has explicity stated that the Lord by his inscrutable and terrible power covers up the self-luminosity of the individual. When the

individual becomes the recepient of *aparokṣajñāna* he will have the six encasements shattered but not until he becomes the recepient of God's grace through which the seventh also is removed that he becomes capable of enjoyment of bliss. That is why God is spoken of as one who grants bliss to the *Muktās* or the liberated ones. Hence this encasement due to Lord's will is the most important one and the others are merely *nimittās* or subordinate agents.

One thing should be clear from the study of the *tattvas* and their divisions and subdivisions. In Madhva philosophy Hari stands as the Supreme. At every step His glory, His power is eulogised. It is His will that does or undoes things. It is He who is the giver of everything. Sri Rāghavendraswāmy in his commentary details these in the following words and we shall conclude this account by quoting him.

paramatmanā kriyamāṇa jagato janmādaya vyāpārah bahavah. tatra cetaneṣu yogyānam jñānadimatam mokṣa dānam muktānam saukhyadānam. ayogyānam mithyājñānadveṣādidānam. tadyogyamuktidānam duhkhabhayādi dānam. miśrānām sukhaduhkhādyubhaya dānam. jadeṣu bhāvakārya padārthānām vrddhikṣayādidānam. abhavesu prāgabhāvasyanāśadānam. dhvamsasya janmadānam taikālika abhāvasya śaśvādekaprakāratādānamityadayah.

That is to say the activities of the Lord who creates the world are manifold. To instance a few: It is He who gifts to the deserving sentients knowledge and devotion. It is He again who gives to the ones that have right knowledge liberation and to the liberated bliss. To the non-deserving He gives false knowledge and hatred. He again is the giver of fear and pain. It is again He who gives even to the non-sentient ones

such functions as growth and decay. In short every activity be it connected with the sentient or the non-sentient is ultimately due to Him.

If the Advaita system places before the aspirant the ideal of the One Supreme, formless, inscrutable, unthinkable, beyond all words, a cold and comfortless entity and denies to all the rest no real existence, Madhva places before us an ideal vibrant with life, full of all the wealth and grandeur of its manifoldness, an ideal that recalls the fullness of the Cosmic Vision that was granted to Arjuna on the battlefield by Sri Krishna. But it at the same time solves the dichotomy of the clash of plurality of reals by the assertion of *svātantrya*. The ring of *svātantrya* is audible everywhere in the writings of Madhva. It is only when we attune ourselves to hear this ring that we would have started on the path to the relation of that *parātparatattva*, the *svatantratattva* namely Viṣṇu. May this halting incomplete endeavour to present the *tattvas* as propounded by Sriman Madhvācārya, an endeavour that was undertaken by Hari's own inspiration be the humble offering at the feet of the Lord.

GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS

Abhava:

Negation. One of the seven *padārthās* or categories of the *Nyāya* and accepted by all the philosophers except the *Prābhakara* school of *Mīmaṁsakās*, abhāva-non-existence. *Abhāva* is variously divided into *Saṁsargābhāva*, non-existence born of contact, *anyonyābhāva*, mutual or excluding non-existence, *prāgabhāva* (q.v.) anterior or prior non-existence, *pradhvamsābhāva* (q.v.) posterior non-existence or non-existence after destruction, *atyantābhāva* or *sadābhava* (q.v.) non-existence at all time. A subject that has given rise to much speculative hair-splitting logical writing and has also its connection with the subject of *ajñānā* or nescience in that discussions relating to whether *ajñāna* is a positive entity or just absence of knowledge etc. The acceptance of this category and its relationship to the existent have also been at the back of some of the refined modes of logical expressions found abundantly in logical treatises wherein the terms *anuyogi* (q.v.) and *pratiyogi* (q v.) are used to the delight of those who revel in Miltonic prose structures.

Abheda:

Identity. Qualities which subsist throughout and exist as long as the object exists are spoken of here as possessing identity.

Abhimāni Adhikaraṇa:

The *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa which has been commented upon by the various acāryas is divided

into four sections or *pādās* and each *pāda* is further subdivided by the commentators on the basis of the subject matter of a group of *sūtras*. One such *adhikaraṇa* or subject division is the *abhimānī adhikaraṇa*. The adhikaraṇa is purported to deal with the question of the presiding deities over non-sentient items of *prakṛti*.

Acetana:

The non-sentient. The existents as opposed to the non-existents are divided into the *cetana* or the sentient and *acetana* or the non-sentient. In Madhva philosophy the *acetana* category is a sub-division of the dependent category or the *asvatantra*.

Adharma:

The opposite of *dharma* or what is righteous. *Dharma* is defined as that which sustains the universe and *adharma* is that which is opposed to it. It should be noted that the word has differing senses and connotations and the sense of what is an intrinsic quality also is found in the word *dharma*. Further it does not connote those things that are generally associated with sin. For instance a course of action or attitude might be *adharma* from one standpoint and the same might be *dharma* from a different one. Often man is landed in a dilemma when baffling situations where it is difficult to decide what is *dharma* and *adharma* arise. The classical example is of Arjuna on the battlefield of *Kurukṣetra*.

Advaita:

Non-duality. *Dvaita* is the quality of duality. Although many might take the word as standing for

the philosophy known as Advaita Vedānta or Non-dualistic Vedānta, the term is used in the general sense of something that is non-dual. For instance in the famous verse of Bhavabhuti's *Uttararāmacharita* we have the expression *advaitam sukha duhkhayoh* etc. The mere appearance of this word in any sacred text need not be taken as giving authoritative credence to the Non-dualistic view. *Advaita* as a mode of philosophy is the one propagated by Śrī Śankarācārya and and it has also led to other varieties of Vedanta which retain the name with a qualification. For instance Rāmānuja's system is entitled *Viśiṣṭādvaita* or qualified monism. There are other schools like the *Śuddhādvaita* etc. *Advaita* is one of the strictly absolutist philosophies of India though the other qualified ones cannot claim to have this appellation. *Sivādvaita* and *Viśiṣṭādvaita* etc. have deistic elements and do not have this absolutist character. Even among the Madhvas an attempt to designate the system as *Svatantrādvaita* was made. Though this originated from a desire to emphasise the mono-theistic character of the system, it has not found much favour.

Advaitin is a follower or propounder of the non-dualistic school of philosophy. Normally the term is used to designate the *Śaṅkara* school and its followers. The suffix *in* in Sanskrit indicates in these cases the sense of belongingness or relation or following. Hence we may speak of *dvaitin* for a follower of *dvaita* school and *viśiṣṭadvaitin* for the follower of the *Rāmānuja* school of *Vedanta*.

Ajānajānadeva:

This term is used for those gods who do not have any specific names but are born in godly families or

clans. Madhvācārya in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* has the following verse in comment on these gods:

anākhyātā devatāstu jātā devakule ca yāh
ājānadevatāstāhi . . .

This class of gods is superior to the manes but they are below the *karmadevatāh*.

Akuncana:

One of the five modes of *karma* as enunciated in the *Nyāya* texts. Constriction. This classification of the *Nyāya* does not appear to be very scientific.

Aṁśa: aṁśin:

The part and the whole. In Madhva the *aṁśin* is accepted as distinct from the totality of parts.

Amukta:

One who is not liberated. *mukta* is a liberated being. The term may be used for all those who are not yet liberated.

Anādi:

Beginningless. Compare *ananta*. Like the axioms of science the Indian philosopher too has his own hypotheses. The '*anādi*' items are characteristic of each school of philosophy. *Jīvās* and *Karma*—these are regarded as *anādi*.

Ananta:

Literally that which has no end; *anta* meaning end. *Ananta* a negative derivative from *anta* means endless. The qualities of the Lord are *ananta*. Hence the term also comes to stand in the sense of one who

possesses such innumerable and endless virtues. With reference to the *Jīvās* it is the name of one of the *Jīvās* considered by the *Rāmānuja* school as free from the taint of misery while the Madhva school does not accept this view; Ramā being the only other who is free from the taint of misery.

Anitya:

Non-eternal. The opposite of the *nitya* or the eternal. The term has different meanings in different systems but in the Madhva it does not connote the idea of the non-existence of substances as in the Buddhist schools. The non-eternal entities are those that either are now and get destroyed in course of time, or not being now in existence come into being later. But those that exist always in all the three times are the *nitya* or the eternal ones. In Indian philosophy and religion the word *nitya* has a charm of its own and much poetry aquires its poignancy by this charm that goes with the word. The senses of 'evanescent' 'fleeting' 'insubstantial' and something on which man ought not to build like building on sand; all these go with the word.

Anuyogi:

The substratum with reference to which a negation is stated. A technical term often used in *Nyāya* writings. In a statement like 'On this floor there is the absence of a jar. Jar is the *pratiyogi* (q.v.) or the counterpositive of the absence of jar and the floor is the *anuyogi*.

Ārambhavada:

The non-identity view of causation held by the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣikās*. See *asatkāryavāda*.

Asatkāryavāda :

The theory of causation which says that the effect does not exist at all in the cause and an altogether new thing is created. *Asatkāryavāda* may also be called the non-identity theory as this posits a difference between the cause and the effect. This is also known as the ārambhavāda (q.v.) In contradistinction to this view of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas the *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṁkhya school (q.v.) is one of identity.

Atyantābhāva :

Absolute non-existence. A classification of *abhāva* in the *Nyāya* system and in others also which refers to things that are non-existent at all times. An example is the barren woman's son. In Madhva's system the term *sadābhāva* is used.

Avayava :

Member. Generally used for the members of a syllogism. In the traditional Indian logic *avayavas* are five as the syllogism was a five-memberd one. In inferring fire from smoke issuing forth from a mountain the five steps are as follows: This mountain is on fire-(1) *pratijña*. Because smoke is issuing forth from it (2) *hetu* or the reason. Wherever there is smoke there is fire. (3) *vyāpti* or invariable concomittance. Just as the kitchen which has fire and smoke. (4) *dṛṣṭānta* or illustrative example. Therefore this mountain has fire. (5) Conclusion. Madhva logicians contend that there is no need that the process of syllogism should invariably be five-membered for it is possible to have inferences achieving their purpose with fewer members.

Avidyā :

Nescience or ignorance that envelopes the jiva and thus makes it incapable of enjoyment of bliss or realisation of its true nature. A rather difficult word, used in widely different senses and full of subtelty. In a sense this might be contrasted with the idea of original sin for what clouds the individual and obstructs his spiritual upliftment is not sin but this original ignorance. In *advaita* it is a cosmic principle clouding the one Reality. Dvaita does not accept this.

Bheda :

Difference. In the system of Madhva there are five distinct varieties of *bheda*. Difference is fundamental and not just a seeming entity as in the absolutist philosophy. There is considerable writing in the school devoted to the exposition of the subject of *bheda* or difference and one of the treatises of Sri Vyāsarāya Swāmy is *Bhedojjīvana*.

Bhedābheda :

Difference-non-difference. The relationship between the qualities and the substances, of action and that which has action etc. has been illustrated by Madhva to be one of difference-non-difference. There is also a school of Vedantic philosophy upholding the difference non-difference view of the Universe. Certain scriptural texts are shown to lend support to this view, just as there are others which substantiate the *bheda* view and some which seem substantiate the *abheda* doctrine.

Bhoga :

Enjoyment. The word often brings to mind the

opposite *tyāga* or giving up. The human body is defined as the abode of *bhoga* or enjoyment.

Bhramaṇa:

Revolving movement. One of the additional types of movement referred to in *Nyāya* texts but included under the five kinds listed by them denying to this and a few others the status of an independent member in classification.

Bhūta:

Element. The five elements are Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Sky. It can also be used for the living creatures. *Bhuta* also means what is past, as in the *bhutakāla* or the past time.

Bhūtākāśa:

Ākāśa according to Madhva is of two kinds: the elemental *ākāśa*, one of the five and a special kind of *ākāśa*, *avyākṛta ākāśa*.

Brāhmaṇa:

The first of the four castes, the other three being *kṣatriya*, *vaiśya and śūdra*. The class of people devoted to study and teaching and the pursuit of a life of the spirit. Though later practices have tended to fossilise the institution of caste into one based on birth, in original intention and practice the castes were based on functions. *Brāhmaṇa* also stands for that class of expository and illustrative texts containing liturgical details which follow the mantra or hymns portion of the vedas. The vedas collectively being divided variously into *mantra*, *brāhmaṇa āraṇyaka* and *upaniṣads*. For further details and the implications of the

word in the above two senses see: *Facets of Ancient Indian Education and their Modern Relevance* by R. A. Kashyap.

Bṛhaspati:

Name of one of the gods. In the *Ānanda Mīmaṁsa* placed higher than Indra but lower than *Brahmā* The preceptor of the gods, considered a great intellectual, perhaps the greatest. Hence metaphorically and in sarcastic expressions used for an intelligent person and an ignoramus too. In the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patanjali on the *Sūtrās* of Pāṇini we find reference to the anecdote where the god Indra is supposed to have studied under *Bṛhaspati* for a period of one thousand celestial years, going through each and every word of the Sanskrit language. The result was that he could not complete it.

Buddhi:

Intellect. One of the evolutes from *prakṛti*. Buddhi occurs in varying senses and each philosophy has its own sense given to this word. It is to be differentiated in the senses of a category and knowledge.

Cetana:

The sentient as opposed to the non-sentient or the *acetana* (q.v.) One of the categories into which the existents are divided.

Chala:

One of the sixteen categories into which the Nyāya system divides the universe of knowables. Fraud as applied to argumentation.

Daitya:

One among the categories of beings consigned to hell eternally.

Among these some might already have been cast into hell and others may be in the course of being cast into hell or damnation.

Darśana:

A system of thinking and a way of life in one. Philosophy in India also was a way of life. It is not merely speculative in nature.

Darśanakāra:

A propounder of a system of philosophy in India, a philosophy that suggests a way of life also.

Deśa:

Space. Time and space are both intuited by the sākṣi.

Devagandharva:

One of the graded beings referred to in the calculus of bliss or the *Ānandamimāṁsa* in the *Taittiriyopaniṣad.* The bliss of these is reckoned to be a hundred fold greater than that of the *manuṣyagandharvas.*

Dharma:

Righteousness. A word which is rather difficult to translate. See note on *Adharma.* A term used in Buddhist metaphysics also. The broader category which is further divided into heaps or groups or *skandhas* (q.v.)

Dravatva:

One of the qualities enumerated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school; the quality referring to the possibility

of a substance being liquefied. In some of the Nyāya texts there is an argument relating to whether gold is to be included in the category of Fire. One of the arguments advanced makes out feebly the case that gold does not possess this quality of *dravatva.*

Dravya:

Substance. A rather difficult category to define as Mahamahopadhyaya Satkari Mukherji points out in his Preface to an English Translation of the Bhasha Pariccheda of Viswanatha Pancanana. The first of the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣikas.

Dṛṣṭānta:

Illustrative example. In Nyaya syllogism an invariable concomittance has to be referred to an example where both the *sādhya* or the thing that is to be proved and *hetu* or *sādhana* or the reason are found. One of the sixteen categories enumerated by Gautama.

Duhkha:

Sorrow. misery. One of the pairs of dualities familiar in Indian religion and philosophy. *Sukha* and *duhkha,* happiness and misery.

Duhkhasaṁstha:

Those who are in misery. Those who are liberated from misery and those who are still undergoing suffering belog to this class.

Duhkhaspṛṣṭa:

One of the classes into which the *cetana* is divided. The beings that are misery-tainted.

Dhukhāspṛṣṭa :

One who is untouched by misery. Hari and Ramā are the only two that are untainted by misery. Such classifications are based on the revealed scriptures and in these there is a divergence among the followers of Rāmānuja.

Gamana:

Movement. One of the five kinds of *karma* or activity found in the Nyāya texts.

Gandha:

Smell. The distinguishing mark of the element *pṛthivi*. Nyāya texts define *pṛthivi* as Gandhavatī or one that possesses smell.

Garuḍa :

The mythical bird, the bird on which Lord Vishnu is supposed to ride. One of the liberated beings, but not of the *dukhāspṛṣṭa* class. The Rāmānuja school considers *garuḍa* with others as those who are untainted by misery.

Guṇa :

Quality. In the Nyāya system these are 24 in number. In Sāṁkhya and other systems the term *guṇa* is used for the three *guṇas—sattva, rajas* and *tamas*, the three strands that go to make up *prakṛti*. Of course the other sense also is there in these systems. *guṇin*—the possessor of a quality or *guṇa*. The relation between *guṇa* and *guṇin* is a matter for considerable speculation and thought in Indian philosophy.

Gurutva :

Heaviness. One of the 24 qualities enumerated in the Nyāya.

Iccha :

Desire. One of the qualities of the Nyāya school.

Indra :

The overlord of the heavens. In the **Vedas** he occupies an exalted position. In the Upaniṣads we hear of him as a great student. In the *purānic* period his eminence appears diminished and the common man's notion of him seems to be that of a god who is jealous of his position and who does everything to prevent people who wish to obtain the place of Indra by performing a hundred horse sacrifices.

Indriya:

The sense. Five *karmendriyas* and five *jñānedriyas* are distinguished. *Manas* also is regarded as an *indriya*; In all they total eleven.

Jaḍa :

Inert matter. Opposed to *Jīva* or the *cetana* which is sentient. *Prakṛti* is regarded as *jaḍa*.

Jalpa :

One of the sixteen categories of the Nyāya school and also one mode of *kathā* or discourse according to Madhva. (Vide *Kathalaksana*) Wrangling.

Jāti:

Generic quality. *Sāmānya* (q.v.) is also another word for this. Nyāya view is that this is *nitya* or eternal. Madhva does not agree with this. *Jāti* also means wrong objection in the older Nyāya school and is one of the sixteen categories of the Nyāya.

Jiva :

The Individual soul or self or life-monads (to use the expression of Ninian Smart). The conception of *jiva* varies from one school to another. Even when *jiva* is regarded as a *pratibimba* the sense in which this word *pratibimba* is to be understood again differs with each philosophy. To distinguish the two the terms *Jivātma* and *Paramātma* also are used.

Jñāna :

Knowledge.

Jñānendriya :

Organs of sense. (See *indriya*).

Kāla :

Time. The concept of time is an interesting one in philosophy and Indian thinkers have defined it and classified it in many ways, *Kāla* as that which encompasses the past, present and the future is to be regarded as something distinct from that which is cut up into moments etc. In Madhva one is eternal and the other fleeting. *Kāla* is also perceived by the *sākṣin* (q.v.)

Kārana :

The cause.

Kārika :

Aporistic verse, generally written in the eight-syllabled *anuṣṭubh* verse, though not necessarily so. For we do come across many instances of *āryā* metre being employed. A survey of verses indicates that the author has been forced to resort to the *āryā* metre as his thought escapes concise expression within the limits

of the anuṣṭubh or the *śloka* metre. The idea is that the expression should be memorisable and should lend itself to easy though succinct handling. It serves the purpose of a synopsis and renders memorisation easy. (For detailed exposition of many mnemonic devices in Sanskrit the curious reader may consult : *Facets of Ancient Indian Education and their Modern Relevance* by R. A. Kashyap).

Kārya :

The effect,

Karma :

One of the seven categories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Action.

Karma:

Also stands for the action done by an individual and its results. It is this result of past deed or action that binds the *jiva* and this can only be washed away by submission to the effect. *Karma* is an important concept in Indian philosophy. The doctrine of *karma* with the theory of metempsychosis in direct contrast with the Western views engenders a whole set of attitudes, behaviour patterns etc. In two distinctly opposed views of life karma stands opposed to the theory of inaction or sannyas and the *Bhagavadgita* attempts a syncretism by bringing in the concept of *karmayoga*. In Vedic literature we come across the karmakanda or the ritualistic portion and the *jñāna-kanda* or the knowledge portion. *Karma* and *jñāna* thus appear to be polar. In Modern Indian religious thought the emphasis has tended to be on *karma*.

Karmadeva :

Those who have attained the status of gods by munificent deeds like gifting land etc. are known as the karmadevās and these are given a status in respect of bliss a step higher than the ajānajāna devatās (q.v.). The Bhāṣya of Sriman Madhvācārya defines these as follows: . . . tabhyo'gryāh karmadevatāh.

Balyādyā antarā prāptadevatāh karmadevatāh. That is to say the karmadevatās or superior to the ajānajānadevatās and these are the ones who obtain the status of godhood sometime later though at the time of creation they have not the said status.

Karmendriya ;

The organs of action as contrasted with the jñānendriya. These may be designated motor organs and the latter sensory organs.

Khandita :

Broken, interrupted. Expression here is used for *bheda* aspect of the relation between the substances and their *guṇas* or qualities.

Kriyāvat :

That which has action, kriyā-action, another term for karma (q.v.)

Lakṣaṇa :

Definition. A definition is meant to enable a person to identify an object or concept and recognise it and use the word which is applied for the object in common daily intercourse. It also has the function of separating the object from dissimilar ones. The two purposes of definition are *vyavahāra* and *vyavṛtti,*

daily intercourse and differentia. In Nyāya logic the the emphasis on differentia has resulted in long-winded, heavily qualified definitions of things.

Lakṣya :

Definitum, the object that is defined. A *Lakṣaṇa* must be found in the *lakṣya* or else the object is outside the purview of the *lākṣaṇa.*

Linga :

In Indian logic the *hetu* or the reason employed for arriving at a conclusion. Also elsewhere stands for the phallus-like symbol used to designate Lord Siva.

Lingasarira :

The subtle body which the *Jiva* is supposed to have after the destruction of the corporeal frame at death.

Maṅgala :

Benedictory verse. Invocatory verse. It is believed that the performance of *mangala* will result in the completion of work.

Madhya :

The middling. Of the three categories of those who proceed upward, who remain in *saṁsāra* and who are destined to go downward. The middle ones.

Mānuṣa :

Mortal, relating to man. The first of the units mentioned in the Anandamimāṁsa in terms of which all other units are reckoned. According to Madhva this unit of bliss is the one enjoyed by the Mortal

Emperor of the *Tretā Yuga.* An emperor who is possessed of desirable virtues and who has attained the results accruing from studies. He is also termed an *Adhvāyaka.* After such an one is liberated from the *lingasarīra* he attains this bliss.

Manuṣyagandhrva :

The next class of persons whose bliss is a hundred fold more than the bliss of the Mortal Emperor or *Mānuṣa.*

Martyādhama :

The lowliest of human beings. Those who by reason of their undesirable acts are heading towards hell and damnation.

Mīmāṁsa :

A calculus. Something that lends itself to measurement or is measurable. *Mīmāṁsa* is the term used for two systems of philosophy, the *Pūrvamīmāsa* school of Jaimini and his followers and the *Uttaramīmāṣa* or the Vedanta. Generally the word is applied only to the earlier school and the word Vedanta is more commonly used for the latter one. *Mīmāṁsa* is greatly concerned with the interpretation of Vedic texts and with the ritualistic portion of the Vedas. The two schools that later developed are the Prābhākara and the Bhāṭṭa school, the latter of the famous Kumarila Bhaṭṭa supposed contemporary of Śaṅkara. The later philosophies in India are heavily indebted to the *Mīmāṁsa* school for various disciplines of philosophic interpretation and methodology. Considerable Textual Criticism and study is also to be found in this school as the followers applied themselves

closely to the study and interpretation of Vedic texts, Madhva thinkers like Jayatīrtha and more particularly Vyāsarāya have criticised many of these views of the *Mīmāṁsa* school and they have their own alternatives. *Tarakaṭāṇḍavam* of Vyāsarāya deals with many of these.

Mukta :

The liberated. Again here the class is divided into the sub-divisions of gods, the sages, the manes, emperors and men.

Muktiyogya :

Those who are eligible for liberation.

Muktyayogya :

Those who are ineligible for liberation. A category which has given rise to much controversy, particularly among those who pin their faith on a too-optimistic concern with the liberation of the worst of mortals.

Nīca :

The lowly. *Uccha,* the high, the *madhya,* the middling and *nīca,* the lowly, the three divisions adopted by Madhva in classifying souls competent for liberation.

Nigrahasthāna :

Occasion for reproof. Elaborately discussed and developed by the older school of *Nyāya* and enumerated as one of the sixteen categories. In Madhva *nigrahasthānas* are shown to be within the category of defects or fallacies of argument. Jayatīrtha's *Pramaṇapaddhati* has a very elaborate discussion on this topic

and the numerous examples and kinds of *nigrahasthāna* are shown to be merely fallacies of argument. For further details see our *An Introduction to Madhva Epistemology.*

Nimitta :

Agent. The Supreme Lord is the one who is responsible for everything that happens but there are the lower gods who are his agents and who 'post, over the universe at his behest or who engage themselves in various assigned roles. Cf the Gita : *nimitta mātram bhava savyasācin.* O Arjuna who is dexterous at weilding the bow with your left hand, be thou just an agent of mine. *Nimitta* may also mean omen, good or bad.

Nirṇaya :

Settlement. One of the categories of *Nyāya.*

Niscayātmika .

That which has the capacity for arriving at certainity. Used as an attribute to *buddhi.* Contrast the term *saṁśayātmika,* the *manas* or mind is said to be such.

Nitya :

The eternal. What is eternal and what is not is a matter that engages the attention of the philosopher to a great extent.

Nyāya :

One of the six systems of Indian philosophy, the orthodox ones. Its propounder is the famous Gautama who wrote the *Nyāaasūtra* which has been commented upon by *Vyāsa* and others.

Nyaya :

A maxim. For instance the *andhapangu nyāya,* the maxim of the blind and the lame person. When certain difficult situations in philosophic explanation arise resort is made to the maxims. A few others are the *Markatakishora nyāya* the *mārjārakishora nyāya* etc. The two respectively mean the maxims of the mother monkey and its offspring and the mother cat and its offspring. In the first case the child has to exert by holding the mother if it wishes to be carried from place to place while in the case of the cat the mother carries the young one itself and deposits it in a safe place. Man's relation with God is likened to these two.

Pa :

The king. Not frequently used in literary Sanskrit. Derived from the root pa-to pretect. One who protects therefore is 'pa' The more common expressions are *nṛpa* and *nrpati* etc. for a king. Such words are coined by writers for excigencies of metrical correctness.

Para :

The higher. Used with reference to *jāti* or genus. *parā* and *aparā* mean that universal which is more comprehensive and inclusive and that which is less so.

Paratarатattva :

The supreme Truth, that which is beyond all else. In Madhva philosophy it is Hari, the Supreme Lord.

Paratva :

The quality that is inherent in anything that is '*para*' higher. One of the qualities enumerated in the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* system.

Parikṣā :

Examination. One of the disciplines in philosophy.

Parimāṇa :

One of the twenty-four qualities enumerated by *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.* Bulk.

Piśaca :

A class of condemned beings.

Pitṛ :

The manes. The parent. In the dual form the word stands both for mother and father. *Pitṛloka* – the world of the manes. One of the five classes of beings eithers already liberated or in the process of being libereted. The term occurs also in the Taittirıyopaniṣad under its *Ānandamimāmsa.*

Pradhāna :

See *prakṛti.*

Pradhvamsābhāva :

Posterior non-existenee or non-existence after destruction. See *abhāva.*

Prāgabbhāva :

Anterior non-existence. A non-existence that is potentially found until an object comes into being. See *abhāva.*

Prajāpati :

The Creator or Brahma. According to the inter pretations of Madhva in his *Taittiriyopanisad bhāṣya,* Prajapati is the liberated *Seṣa* or otherwise called

Rudra also who is entrusted with creation. The last but one of the graded beings who enjoy bliss of varying and increasing measure.

Prakṛti :

Nature or according to the other term often used, namely *pradhāna*—what is posited before. The primoridial stuff out of which the universe has evolved. This is constituted of three strands or *guṇas* and in *Sāṅkhya* and in Madhva systems evolves into the manifold universe which we are experiencing. It is regarded as a unitary whole in which the three *guṇas* are blended. *Prakṛti* also means the primary nature of what is under cosideration. It thus has the senses of character, disposition and in linguistics root.

Pramāṇa :

May also be translated as basis of knowledge in the first sense. In Indian philosophy six such bases are known : perception, inference, analogy, testimony, implication and negative perception. The Materialistic schools, the *Cārvākas* accept one only, the perception. The Buddhists accept the first two, perception and inference. The *Nyāya* school accepts the first four, the *Mīmāṁsa* and the non-dualistic Vedanta accept the six modes while the Vedanta schools of Madhva etc. accept only the three—Perception, Inference and Testimony. *Pramāṇa* comes from mā—to measure, the same root being the basis for the word *Mīmāṁsa* also. These bases of knowledge measure the correctness of knowledge. *Pramāṇa* is also used loosely as proof without these senses. The other related words which may be clearly distinguished are *Prameya* : The object of investigation, *pramātā*—the knower or the

investigator, *pramā* or the result of investigation or the correct conclusion the investigator reaches about the object of knowledge, *prāmāṇya* or the validity of the conclusion or knowledge. These are subjects of detailed study in epistemology and the reader may refer to *An Intoduction to Madhva Epistemology* by the author.

Pramiti :

Knowledge.

Prāṇa :

The vital air or breath or the energy principle. This is to be distinguished from the deity *Mukhyaprāṇa*.

Prāptāndhatamas :

Those who have been consigned to hell. See Jayathirtha's distinction in the exposition under this in the body of the book.

Prārabdhakarma :

The action that has already taken effect and thus determines the framework within which a man born has to function. This has to be enjoyed and suffered.

Prasārana :

One of the activities among the five enumerated in the *Nyāyavāiśeṣika* school. Stretching.

Pratiyogī :

The counter positive. The object whose non-existence is the subject of consideration is called the *pratiyogī*. See *Anuyogī*.

Pṛthaktva :

Seperateness. One of the qualities.

Pravṛtti :

Tendency, inclination.

Prayatna :

Effort. One of the twenty four *guṇas* of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas*.

Prayojana :

Purpose, aim, one of the categories of the older school of *Nyāya*.

Purāṇas :

The Mythological books. Vyasa is supposed to have written in addition to the epic *Mahābhārata* eighteen *purāṇas* some of which are *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, *Garuḍapurāṇa*, *Agnipurāṇa*, *Brahmavaivarta*, etc. There are also secondary *purāṇās* or *Upapurāṇas*. Many of these deal with mythology and they deserve study from the point of view of Myth. Some of them appear to be some kind of encyclopaedic works with all sorts of subjects being brought into them.

Puruṣa :

Literally 'person' or 'man'. *Puruṣa* in contradistinction to *prakṛti* is the eternal element in living beings. Sāmkhya posits two reals—*prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*. One is the non-sentient and the other the sentient. In Vedānta we have the *Uttamapuruṣa*, the supreme Person or Lord.

Rajas :

The second of the three *guṇas* of *Prakṛti*, the *guṇa* that is responsible for activity, vigour and such things. Used in common parlance it signifies a passionate.

headstrong temperament and religiously considered not very praiseworthy. See also *Sattva* and *tamas*.

Rakṣa ;

One of the categories of beings condemned to hell and damnation.

Ramā :

The consort of the Lord Hari, the only other who is not misery-tainted.

Recana :

Throwing out. One of the types of action not listed independently among the five types of karma.

Ṛsi :

The sage. One of the five types of person that is entitled to liberation or already liberated. *Ṛsi* is seer and is supposed to be gifted with the ability to directly intuite surprasensuous knowledge. *Ṛsi* is not an ascetic as sometimes is misunderstood, we have instances of the greatest *ṛsis* who were married people.

Rūpa :

Form or colour. One of the qualities enumerated in the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* system. The relation between qualities and the substance in which these are found is a matter for varying interpretation. For Madhva's view see the relevant text matter in the book. Also one of the skandhas (q.v.)

Sadābhāva :

Non-existence at all times. The term preferred by Madhva logicians for the Nyāya term, atyantābhāva. See abhāva.

Sādṛśya :

Similarity. Considered in Madhva system as an independent category as the universals are not accepted as eternal and as every thing is regarded as different from everything else. The charge that similarity is in itself a universal is answered by pointing out that relative particulars are relative from the point of view they are examined and hence there is some difference in the similarity between A and B and the similarity between B and A. (Vide Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy—Ninian Smart. pp. 116-117).

Sākṣi :

The appreceptive agent. See page 67.

Śakti :

One of the categories accepted by the Madhva school. Also stands for the feminine creative principle, variously anthropomorphosed into Goddesses. *Śiva* and *śakti* as two principles inseparably blended.

Sāmānya :

The genus or the generic quality. Universal. In Nyāya Vaiśeṣika the universals are treated as eternal. But in Madhva no such status is given to these and as such lead to the positing of the category of Sādṛśya (q.v.)

Sāmānyalakṣaṇa :

A general definition. One of the steps in philosophical inquiry and study. After a general definition then follows the step of classification.

Samaṣṭi :

The beings that are subject to *saṁsāra* or the round of births and deaths. Contrasted with the *vyaṣṭi* (q.v.)

the liberated ones. See text for the difference in opinion regarding the status of Garuḍa, Ananta, etc.

Samavāya :

One of the categories accepted by the Nyāya school. Inherence. For instance the qualities and substance in which these qualities are found are said to exist in a relationship of *samavāya*. This is not accepted by Madhva The Nyāya feels that the relationship between the substance and its properties and atoms in combination is more intimate than one of mere conjunction and as such this is posited as a separate kind of relationship. Conjunction is merely contingent association between two things. An analogy from chemistry would be the difference between mixtures and compounds.

Saṁśaya :

Doubt. A subject of considerable interest in *Nyāya* systems and in the Madhva school also. Elaborate treatment is found in epistemologiccal texts. *See Introduction to Madhva Epistemology.*

Samsargābhāva :

Non-existence dependent on contact or its absence. The first of the two broad divisions of *Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas* so far as *abhāva* is concerned. *Saṁsārgābhāva* and *anyonyabhāva* are these two.

Saṁskāra .

Active tendencies. Continued participation in a way of life and activities leave their respective impressions on the mind and these determine largely the tendencies, the attitudes of people. In Indian common parlance we speak of a good natured person, liberal; cultivated, considerate and courteous as one who is

possessed of good *saṁskāras* or dispositions. Equally well it can be used for bad and reprehensible dispositions also. Sanskrit literature records the utterances of two parrots, one brought up in the house of saintly folk and the other in the house of bandits, uttering pleasant and foul language respectively.

Sāṁkhya :

One of the earliest school of Indian Philosophy, dualistic in character, positing two reals, the prakṛti and puruṣa. Apart from its great metaphysical contributions to Indian Thought, its doctrine of three gunas of Prakṛti has permeated all walks of Indian life. Kapila is the reputed founder of this system. Sāṁkhya is derived from saṁkhya to enumerate. In the earlier stages it stood for philosophy in general.

Saṁyoga :

Combination or unification or conjunction. Note the difference between *samavāya* and *saṁyoga*. the latter being adventitious.

Śastra :

A discipline or study. Science in a broad sense. Any study which leads itself to methodology and system.

Satkāryavāda :

The doctrine of identity in causation, of the *Sāṁkhyas*. See *Asatkāryavāda*.

Sanjña :

Sign. appellation. Also one of the *skandas* of the Buddhists consciousness.

Skandha :

Heap or group. In Pali and Buddhist texts the word is *khandha*. Etymologically the word would mean branch. Aggregate also is another equivalent. In Buddhist philosophy the various types of mental and physical states that go to make up an individual are known by this term. The five skandhas of the Buddhist are corporeal phenomena, feelings, cognitions, active tendencies and consciousness. These groups are not permanent entities but merely refer to classes of states. For instance consciousness is a class of states but not a unitary principle. This doctrines enables Buddhism to break down the common sense belief in a self that persists. The individal is thus broken down to a succession of evanescent events.

Sidhānta :

Conclusion. As opposed to the *purvapakṣa* or the prima facie view or the view of the opponent, the *siddhanta* is established conclusion of the proponent of any school of philosophy. One of the categories of the older *Nyāya* also.

Smṛti :

The remembered texts, the secondary texts in Hindu philosophy as contrasted with *śruti* (q.v.) the revealed texts. The primary texts are the *śrutis* and their statements have greater validity than the secondary ones. These also have a time coordinate while the *śrutis* are regarded as eternal. There are different schools and these have been named after the propounders. *Yajñavalkyasmṛti* would mean that due to the Sage Yajnavalkya.

Sneha :

Cohesion. One of the qualities.

Ṣodaṣapadārtha :

The sixteen categories of the older school of *Nyāya*. The word *padārtha* is to be understood as a nameable and not to be understood in the usual sense prevalent among people.

Sparṣamaṇi :

An elixir or a mineral piece that was gifted with the property of converting base metals into gold.

Śri : Śripati :

The Consort of Lord Visnu, The Lord of Sri. The Supreme Lord Hari.

Śruti :

The revealed scriptures, the Vedas. These are pre-eminent as texts possessing authority. In many of the treatises of Madhva followers interesting discussions relating to the relative validity and authoritativeness of the different kinds of texts and different modes of knowledge are found.

Sṛtisaṁsthita, Sṛthisaṁstha :

Those who are subject to the cycle of births and deaths and neither condemned to hell nor qualified for release.

Śrotriya :

A Brahmin who knows the Vedas. *Śruti* the revealed scriptures. *Śroirtya* is one who is versed in *śruti*. It is only through constant and painstaking and

persevering practice that one can quality to the title of a *śrotriya.* It is no easy estate coming on one from the accidents of birth.

Sūtra:

An aphorism. A short and succinct statement about any theory, or conclusion or direction. The *sūtra* literature must have developed at a time when the need for collecting knowledge in 'capsule' form must have arisen. They may be likened to the formulae in mathematics, the equations in chemistry or physics. Sometimes the desire to shorten has gone to such an extent that the result has been one of ambiguity and the rising of rival schools of interpretation. In ingenuity the *Vyākarṇa sūtras* of *Pāṇini* are unsurpassed. It is often said that the Grammarian would exult if he could reduce his *sūtra* by half a moment of utternace as he would in having fathered a male child. *Sūtra* literally means thread and because it knits together various things in a system it is so called. The old mode of learning adopted two processes—one of abridgement and another of enlargement by exposition; *samāsa* and *vyāsa* as they are called. These were some of the modes of memorising huge and unweildy material at a time when other mechanical modes were unknown.

Svārtha:

Selfishness. For one's own sake. The term is used without any derogatory sense in philosophical treatises to stand for something that is undertaken for oneself. For instance inference may be for one's own edification or for another. *Svārtha anumāna* is inference for oneself. In ethical injunctions one is asked to give up pursuit of one's own selfish ends.

Svarūpa:

Essential nature of oneself.

Svatantra:

The Independent. Hari is the only independent category. This independence is in respect of one's essential nature, knowledge and volitional activity.

Syandana:

Flowing. One of the types of action.

Tamas:

The last of the three *guṇas* of *Prakṛti*. See *sattva* and *rajas*. See our discussion concerning the *guṇas* as presented by the *Sāṅkhya* school and the Madhva school.

Tamogah:

Those who are bound to proceed to hell. The class of beings condemned to hell and damnation.

Tarka:

Ratiocination. A great deal of discussion pertains to '*tarka*' in the older school of Nyāya and the New Nyāya. The Madhva school considers it as a kind of inference and includes it within Inference. For a detailed discussion of '*tarka*' see our An Introduction to Madhva Epistemology. *Tarka* is also used as a term to refer to the science of Logic. *Tarka* is regarded as not conclusive. *Tarkah apratiṣṭhah*. *Tarka* may be futile and mere quibble which is to be avoided according to injunctions in religious texts. Compare Plato's statements concerning the initial indulgence of persons in futile logic, tearing as two puppies would.

In Indian wisdom there is something that is unattainable by *Tarka*. While the role of *Tarka* is not deprecated its limits are also clearly recognised. Of Newman's remarks in his essay on Gentleman.

Tattva :

The truth. What is in reality,

Tattvajñāna :

The knowledge of the reality or truth. It is through the knowledge of reality that one is enabled to attain the ultimate end and aim of life ; the summum bonum.

Tiryaggamana :

Movement backwards. A kind of activity mentioned in the Nyāya texts.

Ucca :

The high. Contrast the *nīca* or the lowly. The classification of souls into three gradations, the *ucca*, the *madhya* and the *nīca*.

Uddeśya :

The subject. That about which something is predicated or said. The first of the steps in a philosophical inquiry. Something like the general enunciation or statement in Euclidian geometry.

Upādāna :

The efficient cause is called the *upādāna kāraṇa*. A term most used by the Vedantins while the Nyāya school has its divisions of cause into the *samavāyi*, *asamavāyi* and *nimitta*, etc.

Upādeya :

That which is aimed at by the *upādāna*, the effect or the *kārya*.

Upadhi :

A vitiating element adjunct. In Nyāya Vaiśeṣika the existence of wetness in fuel leads to the absence of fire and this is known as *upādhi*. *Upādhi* is a term that has more extensive meaning in Vedanta and is a subject of great discussion in Madhva treatises where the Advaitin's standpoint of the illusoriness of the world is discussed. One of Sriman Madhvacārya's works is known as Upādhikhaṇḍana, the refutation of *Upādhi*.

Upāṅga :

Subsidiary par t or division, generally referred to Vedic texts and studies.

Upaniṣad :

The word literally means what is learnt in the proximity of the guru o r the preceptor. Esoteric and secret doctrine. But it is more often used for the many books that are supposed to be the end parts of the *Āraṇyakas* or the forest treatises. There are many *upaniṣads* but editions of 108 have been published. Of these the most famous are the first ten, *Īśā*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Muṇḍaka*, Taittiriya, *Manḍukya*, *Aitereya*, *Chāndogya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, all of which have been commented upon by the Acāryas. Others of importance are the *Svetāśvatara*, the *Kauṣitaki* etc. There are a number of minor *upaniṣads* and many of them deal with Yoga. There is said to be even an *Allopaniṣad* of a latter-day composition. The *Upaniṣad* is something that is of a generi: character applicable to a class of writings which possesses certain characteristics. Dr. R. D. Ranade's *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, Paul Duessen's Upanisads are some of the excellent works that give a good introduction to this

very important subject. Sriman Madhvācārya also has commented on the ten *upaniṣads* and Raghavendra Swamy has his *Khandarthas* on the *upaniṣads*. The Madhva interpretation radically differs from the normal non-dualistic ones and is very absorbing. *Upaniṣads* have lent themselves to varied interpretations and since they form the raw material for the construction of a philosophy this is inevitable. They have been studied from a purely speculative philosophical point of view and also from a religious and mystic point of of view. Some of the studies of these by Sri Vinoba Bhave deserve attention for their newness of approach, the searching linguistic analysis and the informing aspirant's fervour. Particularly the *Iśāvāsyavṛtti*. the Study of the Upaniṣads (*Upaniṣadanca abhyās* in Marathi) may be consulted.

Urdhvajvalana :

The upward shooting of flames. One of the movements mentioned in the Nyāya school.

Utkṣepana :

Throwing up. One of the five karmas referred to in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

Vāda :

Scholastic discourse. *Vāda* is discourse between the teacher and the taught meant for the finding out of the truth of things. *Jalpa* is a mode of discourse which is intended for victory in debate, and *vitanda* is meant to put the opponent particularly if the person is not amenable to reason on the wrong track. *Kathālakṣaṇa* of Madhvācārya discusses these at length. For further details refer to chapter entitled Katha in

Facets of Ancient Indian Education and their Modern relevance by R. A. Kashyap.

Vaiśeṣika :

The Atomistic school in India which was syncretised in the Nyāya later on. *Kanāda* or the eater of of atoms as he is nicknamed is the propounder of the school, Akshapada is also another name for him. *Vaiśeṣika sūtras* like the *Nyāya sūtras* form the basis of the school. Its theory of the atom etc., compares with some of the earlier theories in Western Chemistry. It is a pity that more scientific study was not directed towards some of its concepts etc. Nyāya uses some of these for its classifications and conclusions. Unlike the Vedanta there is very little or absolutely no following for these schools at present.

Veda :

The Revealed scriptures. The four Vedas are *Ṛg*, *Yajur*, *Saman* and *Atharvan*. These consist according to one view of *Mantra* and *Brāhmana* portions. *Samhitā* is also another word used. The earliest extant literature of the world. The robust realism recaptured by Madhva is from the Vēdas. Another of the Modern thinkers that did something similar is the Maharsi Dayananda Saraswati who also went back to the Vēdas for inspiration.

Vedana :

One of the five heaps in Buddhistic metaphysics. The feeling. The purpose in Buddhist thought is to discredit the notion of a permanent personality by showing it to consist of mere heaps. See *skandha*,

Vedānta :

The most important of the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. The four well known schools are the ones expounded by Sri Sankara, Sri Ramanuja, Sriman Madhvācārya and Sri Vallabha. There are also other schools. In a sense the Vedanta might be called in the words of Gurudev Ranade, the culmination of Indian Thought. Vedanta presses into service the disciplines, the conclusions and methodology of the earlier schools, the *Nyāya*, the *Vaiśeṣika*, the *Sāṁkhya*, the *Yoga* and the *Mīmāṁsa*. The influence of Budhism and Jainism can also be seen. Advaita system seems closer to Budhism and is so close that it is one of the charges of Madhva philosophers that it is no different from Buddhism. Madhva school presses more of the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* into service for its realistic tendencies.

Vibhāga :

Division. The division of any subject into parts.

Vidvatsabha:

The assembly of the learned. Elaborate rules determined these and a very healthy scholastic life existed in them. From the time of the Vedas these have existed and is even today encouraged by the Pontiffs of the various Mutts. Its continuance as a source of healthy intellectual and critical life is very much desired today.

Vijñāna :

Wisdom, consciousness. A rather difficult word having various senses. *Vijñānavādins* are a class of Buddhists who hold to the doctrine of Consciousness. It is the Mahāyāna school. *Vijñāna* occurs in the *upaniṣads* and is variously interpreted. Of the five *kośas* or sheaths one is the sheath of *Vijñāna*. There is subtle distinction between *jnāna* and *vijñāna*.

Vikāra :

Transformation. *Vikārin*—that which is subject to transformation.

Viśeṣa :

Relative particulars in Madhva and Particularity in the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣika* school. For any school of philosophy which insists on difference the concept is an inevitable one.

Viśeṣalakṣana:

Special definition as opposed to the general definition.

Viśeṣoddeṣya :

Special or particular enunciation.

Viṣṇu :

The Supreme Lord Hari.

Viṣvaksena :

One of the class of beings considered not wholly exempt from misery. Contrast the view of Ramanuja on this. See *Vyaṣṭi* and *Samaṣṭi*.

Vitanda :

Cavilling, one of the sixteen categories of Nyāya.

Vyaṣṭi:

The liberated beings. There is a difference of opinion between Madhva and Ramanuja on the place of Garuda, Ananta and Visvaksena.

MADHVACHARYA'S WORKS

Sriman Madhvācārya wrote as many as thirty seven works, some in the form of *bhāṣyas*, some original *prakaraṇa granthas* presenting his theses in succinct aphoristic verses, some books of refutation, some *stotras*. All these books of his have been commented upon by his followers, out of them the '*tikas*' of Srimad Jayatirtha Muni are perhaps the best. Their eminence and popularity have actually earned for Sri Jayathirtha the title of Tikacharya. The terse writings of Madhva can only be understood fully with the aid of Sri Jayatirtha. In fact earlier in the body of this book we have almost made out that it would be desirable to treat Madhva's work along with the Tika of Jayatirtha as a single unit. Sri Jayatirtha was not one of the direct disciples of Madhva and naturally we do come across tikas or tippanis to the works of Madhva by his immediate disciples. After Sri Jayatirtha many others wrote commentaries and glosses but most of them have contented themselves with appending glosses to Jayatirtha's tikas. Even as great a scholar as Sri Vyasaraya who stands in no way inferior to Sri Jayatirtha has done the same, though like Jayatirtha himself, he too has written some original works of unsurpasable erudition. It is a matter of some regret to note that the art of sustained disputation so painstakingly practised in the past which mircilessly swept off the decaying rubble and provided fresh streams of ennobling thought is fast disappearing under the impact of a facile and lazy syncretism hastily engaged in reconciliation. One would devoutly

wish for the day when refutations and counter-refutations could reverberate in the place of all that sound and fury that now tries to steep all lies in the light of truth. Sustained disputation which was giving such a great impetus to the development of philosophy works of the kind which Jayatirtha and Vyasaraya wrote and works that attempted refutations of these and counter-refutations from the proponents have now become scarce. Whether one fully endorses the views of Madhva or his followers this healthy trend should have been kept alive and scholars should have engaged themselves in scholastic disputation and study and brought into the arena material from modern science and philosophy. It is a pity such an attempt has not been made and our philosophical literature has stagnated and very little of original value seems to be being produced.

We give in the following pages a list of the works of Madhva definitely known to be of his authorship with the commentaries on each.

LIST OF MADHVA WORKS AND COMMENTARIES

1. **Rgbhashya**
    1. Srimad Jayathirtha
    2. Rksuci
    3. Jagannatha Tirtha
        1. Tika Vivrtih by Narasimha
        2. Manthratha Sanmanjari by Raghavendraswamy
        3. by Sri Kambalarama Chandrathirtha
2. **Aittareyopanishat Bhashya (Rgveda)**
    1. Upanisat Khandartha by Raghavendraswami
    2. Aittareya Tamra porniyam
    3. by Ramachandra Thirtha
    4. by Varadathirtha
    5. by Visvesatirtha
        1. by Krishnacharya
3. **Isavasyopanisat Bhasya (Suklayajurveda Samhita)**
    1. Yajniya mantra bhashya Vivaranam by Jayathirta Bhiksu
    2. Upanisat Khandartha by Raghavendra Swamy
    3. by Varada Tirtha
        1. Isavasya bhashya Tika vivrithi by Swami Raghunatha
        2. Bhasya Tippani Cchalariya
4. **Brihadaranyaka Upanisathbhasya (Suklayajurveda)**
    1. Upanisat Khandartha by Raghavendra Swamy
    2. Upanisat Khandartha by Raghothama Swamy
    3. Parabrahma Prakasika (Bhavabhodha Bhavartha)by Raghothama Swamy
    4. by Varadatirtha
5. **Katakoupanisad Bhasya (Krishnayajurveda)**
    1. by Vyasatirtha
    2. by Vedesatirtha
    3. Upanisat Khandartha by Vedesatirtha
    4. Upanisat Khandartha by Raghavendra Swamy
    5. by Varadatirtha
        1. Prameya sangraha
6. **Taittiriya Upanisad Bhasya (Krishnayajurveda)**
    1. Bhasya Vivarana Tika by Vyasatirthaswamy
    2. Upanisat Khandartha by Srinivasatirtha
    3. Khandartha by Raghavendra Swamy
    4. Padartha Deepika by Srinivasa Tirtha
    5. by Varada Tirtha
    6. Khandartha Prakasika by Narasimhabhiksu
        1. Prameya Sangraha
7. **Chandogya Upanisad Bhasya (Samaveda)**
    1. Khandartha by Raghavendra Swamy
    2. Padartha Kaumudi by Vedesa Tirtha
    3. Khandartha by Vedesa Tirtha
    4. by Varada Tirtha
        1. Prameya Sangrahah
8. **Talakaropanisat Bhasya (Samaveda)**
    1. Khandartha by Raghavendra Swamy
    2. Khandartha by Vedesa Tirtha
    3. Bhasya Vivarana by Vedesa Tirtha

4. Bhasya Vivarana by Vyasa Tirtha
5. by Varada Tirtha
    1. Prameya Sangraha

9. Satprasnopanisad Bhasya (Atharvana)

1. Khandartha by Raghavendra Swamy
2. by Jayatirtha
3. by Varada Tirtha
    1. Bhasya Tika Tippani by Mankala
    2. Prameya Sangrahah

10. Mandukopanisat Bhasya (Atharvana)

1. Khandartha by Raghavendra Swamy
2. Khandartha by Srinivasa Tirtha
3. Padartha Deepika Bhasyartha by Srinivasa Tirtha
4. Khandartha by Vyasatirtha
5. Bhasyartha by Vyasathirtha
6. by Varada Tirtha
    1. Prameya Sangrahah

11. Atharvanopanisad Bhasya

1. Khandartha by Raghavendra Swamy
2. Atharvana Bhasya Vivaranam by Sri Umarji
3. Bhasya Tika by Vyasatirtha
4. Upanisad Bhasya Vivaranam by Krishnacarya
5. by Varada Tirtha
6. Prakasika by Narasimha bhikshu
    1. Prameya Sangrahah

SUTRA PRASTHANA

12. Brahma Sutra bhasya

1. Tatva Pradeepika by Trivikrama Panditacarya

2. Tattva Prakasika by Jayatirtha bhikshu
3. Tantra Deepika Sutrartha by Raghavendra Swamy
4. Bhasya Deepika by Jagannatha Swamy
5. Sutrartha Mani Manjari by Srimusna Subbaraya
6. Bhasya ghatika Sutrartha Ratnamala
7. Sri Bramhasutrartha nibandha Adhikarana Namavali by Vadiraja
8. Bhava Pradeepika
9. by Vijayendra Tirtha
10. Visaya Vakya Sangraha by Dhirendraswamy
11. Adhikaranartha Sangraha by Dasacarya
12. Nyayamuktavali by Raghavendra Swamy
13. Tattva Manikya Peetiqa by Vijayendra Thirtha

Tattva Prakasika Tippanis

1. Srimad Bhasya Tika Bhavadeepa by Swami Raghavendra
2. by Bidurahalli Srinivasa Tirtha
3. Vakyartha manjari (Sharkara) by Srinivasa Tirtha
4. Gurvarta Deepika by Vadiraja Tirtha
5. Tatparya chandrika
6. Tattva Prakasikasara
7. Bhavaratna Kosa
8. Cchalari
9. Bhavabhodha by Ragavendra Swamy
10. Abinava Chandrika by Satyanatha Swamy.
11. Sista Tatparya Chandrika by Raghavendra Swamy

18. Srimad Anubhasya

1. Tattva Manjari (Tattva Vivrti) by Raghavendra Swamy
2. by Srinivasa Thirtha
3. by Raghunatha Tirtha

14. Srimad Anu Vyakhyanam

1. Nyaya Chandrika by Trivikrama Panditacarya
2. Sanyaya Ratnavali by Padmanabha Tirtha
3. Nyaya Sudha by Jayatirthabhikshu

Nyaya Sudha Tippanis

1. Bhavabhodha (Parimala) by Swami Raghavendra
2. by Yadupatyacarya
3. by Srinivasa Tirta
4. by Srimadavadiraja Swami
5. Vakyartha Chandrika
6. by Srinidhi Tirtha
7. by Kundalagiri
8. by Vittala Bhatta
9. Kasika
10. by Kambali Ramacandra
11. by Gururaja
12. Casaka
13. Sudhasara Sangraha
14. Pradeepa
15. by Visvottama Tirtha

15. Srimad Nyaya Vivaranam

1. Nyaya Vivarana Pancika by Jaya tirtha Bhikshu
2. Nyaya Vivarana Bhodha by Raghothama Swamy

BHARATA GITA PRASTHANA

16. Sri Gita Bhasya

1. Gita Vivrtti by Raghavendra Swamy
2. Prameya Deepika by Jayatirtha Bhikshu
3. Bharata Laksaaalankara by Vadiraja
4. Gita Vivritti by An Acarya
5. Vyakhyana by Coimbatore Padmanabhacarya
    1. Prameya Deepika Bhava Prakasa (Tamrapani) by Krisnacarya
    2. Bhava pradeepika by Srinivasa Suri
    3. Bhava bhodha
    4. by Ragha vendra Swamy
    5. Bhavaratnakosa
    6. Abhinava Tippani (Durbhodha Sthale)
    7. by Varadacarya

17. Sri Gita Tatparya Nirnaya

1. Nyaya deepika by Jayatirtha Bhikshu
    1. Nyaya deepa Kiranavali by Srinivasa
    2. by Raghavendra Swamy

18. Mahabharata Tatparya Nirnaya

1. Bhava Prakasika by Vadiraja
2. Padartha Deepika by Janardhana Bhatta
3. by Varadaraja *(Mahasubhodini)*
4. by Srinivasa Tirtha
5. Sara Sangraha by Raghavendra Swamy
6. by Vedanga Tirtha

19. Yamaka Bharatam

1. by Vijayadhvaja

2. by Tammanna Bhatta
3. by Venkatesvara

20. Bhagavata Tatprya Nirnaya

1. Bhagavata Tatparya deepika by Naraharya-carya
2. by Sreenivasa Tirtha
3. Tika by Yadupatyacarya
4. by Vijayadhvaja

DASA PRAKARANAS

21. Pramana Lakshana

1. by Jayatirtha
2. by Vijayendra
3. by Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta
    1. Bhava deepa by Raghavendra Swamy
    2. by Srinivasa Tirtha
    3. Vedesa Thirtha

2 . Kathalakshanam

1. by Jayatirtha
2. by Vidhyadisha Tirtha
3. by Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta
    1. by Vedesa Tirtha
    2. by Raghavendra Swamy
    3. by Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta

23. Upadhikhandanam (Tattva Prakasika)

1. by Jayatirtha
2. Upanyasa Ratnamala by Vadiraja Tirtha
3. by Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta
    1. Mandara Manjari by Vyasaraya
    2. by Srinivasa Tirtha
    3. ' Parasu ' by Satyanathaswamy

24. Mayavada Khandanam

1. by Jayatirtha Mayavada Khandana Vivarana
2. Upanyasa Ratnamala by Vadiraja Tirtha
3 Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta.
    1. Mayavada Khandana Pancika by Srinivasa Tirtha
    2. Mandara Manjari(Mayavada Khandana Bhavaprakasika) by Vyasaraya Swamy
    3. ' Parasu ' by Satyanatha Swamy
    4. Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta

25. Prapanca Mityatvanumana Khandanam

1. by Jayatirtha
2. Upanyasa Ratnamala by Vadiraja Tirtha
3. by Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta
    1. Bhavaprakasika Tippani (Mandara Manjari by Vyasaraya
    2. Khandana Pancika by Srinivasa Tirtha
    3. ' Parasu ' by Satyanatha Swamy
    4. Mithyatvanumana Khandana Deepika

26. Tattvasamkhyana

1. Tattvasamkhyana Vivarana by Jayatirtha
2. Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta
    1. Tika Vivaranam by Srinivasa Tirtha
    2. Tika Bhavadeepa by Raghavendra Swamy
    3. Kasika
    4. by Satya Dharma Swamy
    5. by Yadupatyacarya
    6. by Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta

7. by Vijayindra Tirtha
8. Keshava Bhatta (Pandurangiya)

27. Tattva Viveka

1. Tattva Viveka Vivaranam by Jayathirtha
2 by Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta
    1. Tika Vivaranam by Srinivasa Tirtha
    2. Viveka Bhava Prakasika (Mandara Manjari) by Vyasamuni

28 Tattvodyota

1. Tattvodyota Vivaranam by Jayatirtha
2. by Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta
    1. Tika Bhavadeepa by Raghavendra Swamy
    2. by Srinivasa Tirtha
    3. Tattvodyota Pancika by Vedesa Tirtha
    4. Dvaita Dyuman
    5. Kasika
    6. by Raghavendra Sisya
    7. by Vijayindra

29. Karma Nirnaya

1. by Jayatirtha
2. by Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta
    1. by Srinivasa Pancika Vivaranam
    2. by Raghavendra
    3. by Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta

30. Vishnu Tattva Nirnaya

1. by Jayatirtha
2. Rotti Venkatadri Bhatta
    1. by Srinivasa Tirtha
    2. Tika Bhavadeepa by Raghavendra

3. by Vijayindra
4. Tamaraparni by Krisnacarya
5. by Gudhaka

31. Narasimha Nakha Stotra

1. Vyakhyana by Visvapati Tirtha
2. Vyakhyana by Cchalari Sesacarya
3. Vyakhyana by Vedatma Swamy

32. Dvadasa Stotra

1. Vyakhyana by Visvapati Tirtha
2. Vyakhyana by Cchalari Narasimhacarya
3. by Janardhana Bhatta
4. by Coimbatore Padmanabhacarya
6. by Punyasravana Tirtha
    1. Tamraparni by Srinivasa Tirtha

33. Krisnamruta Maharnava

1. by Krisnacarya
2. by Srinivasa (Vittalacarya's Son)

34. Tantrasara

1. by Cchalari Sesacarya
2. by Tammanna
3. by Sumatindra Tirtha
4. Tantrasara Songraha Rupa Padyamala
    1. Padabhava Prabhodini by Vedavyasa
    2. by Venkatapati disciple of Srinivasa Tirtha
    3. Sharkara

35. Sadacara Smruti

1. Vaisnavacara Padhati by Narayanacarya
2. Sharkara by Srinivasa Tirtha

3. Vakyartha Vivrttih by Ayinaraharyacarya
    1. by Srinivasa Bhatta
    2. Sharkara
    3. Bhava Prabhodhini by Nararaharya-carya

36. Yatipranava Kalpah

37. Jayanti Nirnaya